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Bargaining Theory and Regulatory
Reform: The Political Logic of
Inefficient Regulation
David B. Spence
Lekha Gopalakrishnan

53 Vand. L. Rev. 599 (2000)

In this Article David Spence and Lekha Gopalakrishnanpropose a new understanding of regulatory bargaining.Economists and
others have long argued that the American regulatorysystem is unnecessarily inefficient. Critics charge that the system is both substantively
inefficient, in that it sometimes mandates the use of inefficient means
for achieving a regulatory goal, and procedurally inefficient, in its
over-reliance on rules. These arguments have led to a wave of regulatory reform experiments in the federal bureaucracy, many of which seek
to promote positive-sum changes in regulatorypolicy through bargaining among private- andpublic-sector stakeholders.As several commentators have noted, most of these regulatory reforms have not met expectations in that bargaining participants often forgo positive-sum
changes in the status quo. Those same commentators have offered a
variety of explanations for these failures, most of which are either
unpersuasive or incomplete. Spence and Gopalakrishnanpropose an
anotherexplanation drawn from the standardbargainingliterature in
economics, one that seems to explain the trajectory of recent regulatory
reforms. The authors argue that, in the context of politicalconflict over
policy changes, participants in these bargainingprocesses view positive-sum policy changes in zero-sum terms. That is, they bargainstrategically, using their power to veto these positive-sum changes to extract furtherpolicy concessionsfrom other stakeholders. This revelation
has important implications for the future of this kind of regulatory
reform.
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INTRODUCTION
Why is regulation inefficient, and why do regulators forgo obvious opportunities to make it more efficient? This is a familiar lament,
one that is heard beyond the confines of academic discourse. For ex599
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ample, in a recent best seller,1 Philip Howard explores the inability of
policymakers to make "common sense' decisions. Howard places the
blame for this phenomenon on "the law," particularly statutes and
rules.2 The evidence he offers in support of his argument is anecdotal,
and many of his anecdotes describe the failure of governmental actors
to take steps that would produce "positive-sum" changes-that is,
changes that would help some without hurting others.' One such
anecdote is the story of a proposed donation to New York City of portable public restroom kiosks, a proposal that seemed likely to offer a
solution to a vexing public health problem. Though the proposed facilities were already road-tested in other large cities and would have cost
the city nothing,' they were not wheelchair-accessible and would violate a city anti-discrimination ordinance Ultimately, opposition to the
proposal led the city to refuse the donation.
Economists have long argued that statutes frequently require
less-than-sensible approaches to policy problems.6 This economic critique of regulation has been particularly unrelenting in the field of
environmental regulation, where economists have criticized the barriers to efficient pollution control posed by environmental statutes and
regulations. In recent years, arguments like these have spurred
(i) calls for reform of environmental regulation by politicians,' (ii) a
series of internal' and external' evaluations and reviews of govern-

1. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW is SUFFOCATING AMERICA
(1994).
2. Id. at 177 ("Principles are like trees in open fields. We can know where we are and where
to go. But the path we take is our own. What good is law today? We fight off rules like branches
hitting us in the face, losing any sense of where we are supposed to be going and bleeding from
illogical dictates that serve no one's purpose.').
3. For a more precise discussion of this concept, see the discussion of "Pareto optimality,"
infra note 12 and Section ll.A.
4. The facilities would have been paid for by renting advertising space on the outside of each
unit. See HOWARD, supranote 1, at 114.
5. Nor would provision of additional wheelchair-accessible facilities in buildings have overcome the legal or political hurdles, because they would not have been provided in the same
location as the kiosks. See id. at 114-15.
6. See the discussion of this literature, infranotes 20-26 and accompanying text.
7. Indeed, regulatory reform legislation has occupied a place on the legislative agenda of
late. See, e.g., House GOPPledges Progresson Reform, Says Help from EPA Would be "Welcome,"
27 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 1656 (1996) (discussing House Republicans' regulatory reform agenda);
Property Rights Measure Most Visible of Several Proposals to Curb Regulation, 25 Envtl. Rep.
(BNA) 2502 (1995) (discussing the Republicans' reform agenda generally); Washington Clarifies
Lender Liability, 26 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 235 (1995) (discussing legislation "already passed by the
House as part of the 'Contract With America,' including regulatory reform with an emphasis on
cost-benefit analysis').
8. The best known recent example is the so-called "Gore Report," or National Performance
Review, which comprised a series of agency-specific reviews. See generally AL GORE, FROM RED
TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS, REPORT OF
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ment regulatory systems, and (iii) a wave of regulatory reform experiments at the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").'" Indeed,
it can be argued that the EPA has become the national focal point of
modern regulatory reform, and that many of the EPA's reform experiments have been aimed at overcoming legal or statutory barriers
to efficiency. However, regulatory reform is rapidly approaching a
crossroads. After more than a half-decade of experiments, pilot projects, and "reinvention" efforts, the EPA seems uncertain where to go
next. Many of its reinvention programs have stalled or have failed to
meet expectations, and the Agency seems unable or unwilling to draw
larger lessons from its successful experiments." This Article represents an attempt to understand and explain why that is.
We argue that, in the context of regulatory reform, the problems that Philip Howard attributes to "the law" are at their core political. This is perhaps not surprising, since most regulatory law is the
product of political processes. Section I outlines the efficiency critique
of regulation, noting two varieties of inefficiency in regulation-substantive inefficiency and procedural inefficiency. Section II explores
the economist's analytical framework for understanding and evaluating these regulatory reform efforts, with special emphasis on the
concept of Pareto optimality'2 and the argument that all available
positive-sum changes from the status quo will be achieved through
bargaining. It then explores several recent regulatory reforms at the
EPA that have attempted to facilitate the bargaining solution in practice, noting that the results to date have been disappointing.

THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW (Sept. 7, 1993). However, as we observe at note 15, infra,
internal reviews of regulatory processes are nearly as old as government regulation itself. For a
summary of those reviews, see infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
9. Perhaps the two most prominent examples are the National Academy of Public Administration's ("NAPA") recent reviews of EPA decisionmaking. See NAPA, SETTING PRIORITIES,
GETTING RESULTS: A NEW DIRECTION FOR EPA (1995) [hereinafter NAPA SETTING PRIORITIES];
NAPA, RESOLVING THE PARADOX OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: AN AGENDA FOR CONGRESS,

THE EPA AND THE STATES (1997) [hereinafter NAPA, RESOLVING THE PARADOX].
10. The EPA's own reform efforts are numerous and varied. They can be tracked via the
EPA's "reinvention" web page, Reinventing Environmental Protection (visited Jan. 21, 2000)
<http://www.epa.gov/reinventt>. We discuss EPA regulatory reinvention efforts, infra at Sections H.B.1-4.
11. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see infra Sections l1.B.1-4.
12. A distribution of goods among members of a group is Pareto optimal when no other distribution (or trades) will make some subset of the group better off without making another
subset worse off. A "Pareto superior" alternative to the status quo is one that would make
someone in the group better off without hurting anyone in the group. In discussing proposed
changes to any status quo, we will use the more conventional term "positive-sum" rather than
"Pareto superior."
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Section III reviews the developing critique of regulatory reform
and proposes another, alternative answer to the question of why EPA
reforms have not met their proponents' expectations. 3 This answer is
suggested by Philip Howard's restroom kiosk example," in which a
group with political veto power perceived an essentially positive-sum
proposal in zero-sum terms. We hypothesize that the same phenomenon is happening now at the EPA: that is, in the larger context of long
term, repeated political conflict over environmental regulation, regulatory reforms that economists would view as positive-sum changes are
viewed by important stakeholders in zero-sum terms. Those
stakeholders, primarily environmental interests inside and outside of
the EPA, veto proposed reforms that would neither harm nor benefit
them, but would benefit their adversaries, primarily industry. We
show that stakeholders exercise this veto power rationally, not only
because they suspect that proposed reforms would harm their interests, but also because this approach maximizes their ability to extract
further concessions from their adversaries in the future.
Section IV examines more closely the EPA's experience to date
with its most celebrated regulatory reform initiative, Project XL, in an
attempt to verify our hypothesis. We conclude that that experience
indeed has been consistent with our analysis, in that certain environmental interests within the EPA have restructured the Project XL
process so as to impede the approval of positive-sum changes to the
status quo. Restructuring also has had exactly the effects desired by
those interests: it has induced firms to offer greater increases in environmental benefits in order to obtain economic benefits that otherwise
would have been vetoed.
Section V concludes with some thoughts on the implications of
our analysis for the future of regulatory reform. We are cautiously
optimistic about its potential for improving regulation in incremental
but important ways, particularly if the rules governing the bargaining
process can be changed to protect the integrity of bargaining outcomes
against legal challenges.

13. Sections II and III represent the further development and elaboration of ideas we presented in an earlier paper entitled The New Political Economy of Regulation" Looking for Positive-Sum Change in a Zero-Sum World, at the Wharton Impact Conference on Environmental
Contracting, Philadelphia, PA. That earlier paper will appear in the published proceedings of
that conference.
14. Howard attributed the kiosk plan's demise to the disabled lobby's perceived infringement of their "rights." See HOWARD, supra note 1, at 113-16.
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I. THE VARIETIES OF REGULATORY INEFFICIENCY
While "regulatory reform" is not a new idea, 5 in the last three
decades the call for regulatory reform has grown stronger, producing a

succession of presidential reform initiatives. Beginning with the Carter Administration and culminating in the Reagan-Bush era, we have
seen a groundswell of opposition to regulation as an impediment to
economic growth, and a general trend toward increasingly centralized

White House review of regulations, 6 culminating in the Bush Administration's Competitiveness Council, headed by Vice President Dan
Quayle." The combination of regulatory reform with regulatory relief

during the Reagan-Bush years led to some confusion of these two
analytically distinct notions. While the elevation of another Democrat
to the presidency in 1992 brought a retreat from the regulatory relief
efforts of the Reagan-Bush years, it did not slow the movement for
regulatory reform. To the contrary, in some ways the Clinton Administration has stepped up the pace of regulatory reform.
The distinction between regulatory relief and regulatory reform
is a distinction between ends and means-between simply reducing
the regulatory burden on industry by lowering standards, and ad-

15. Indeed, studies of regulations and regulatory agencies have filled scholarly journals for
more than a century. For a discussion of the early scholarly debates over administrative reform,
see MICHAEL W. SPICER, THE FOUNDERS THE CONSTITUTION AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: A
CONFLICT OF WORLD VIEWS 26-40 (1995). For a discussion of early reform debates within the
federal government, see JOHN A. ROHR, TO RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 55-167 (1986).
16. This trend is chronicled in RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF
REGULATORY CHANGE: A TALE OF TWO AGENCIES 3-139 (1996). See also David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policymaking: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14
YALE J. ON REG. 407, 416 (1997). Jimmy Carter attempted to address the problem of inefficient
regulation by centralizing the regulatory process in the White House through the use of Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB') oversight of executive branch rulemaking. Ronald Reagan
took that centralization process one step further with his Executive Order No. 12291, under
which the Reagan OMB actively sought to reduce the economic impacts of regulation on industry
and to heighten the importance of cost-benefit considerations in the Agency policymaking
process. For a scholarly analysis of the Reagan Administration regulatory review process, see
Harold H. Bruff, PresidentialManagement of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533
(1989); Thomas 0. McGarity, PresidentialControl of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking,36 AM.
U. L. REV. 443 (1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Deregulation and Reregulation: Rhetoric and
Reality, 6 J.L. & POL. 287 (1989); Peter L. Strauss & Cass Sunstein, The Role of the President
and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986); Peter P. Swire, Incorporation
of Independent Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766 (1985); W. Andrew Jack,
Note, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: Usurpation of Legislative Power or Blueprint for
Legislative Reform?, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 512 (1986).
17. The Council was roundly criticized for providing extra-legal opportunities for input to
the regulatory process for industry, and Congress ultimately voted to remove the Council's
funding. See House Votes To Cut Funds Of Quayle Council, 23 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 776 (1992).
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dressing the question of how best to achieve a given standard. Though
some have pushed unsuccessfully for the former under the guise of the
latter,18 we are interested only in the latter here. The persistent and
broad-based impulse toward regulatory reform has been fed not only
by politicians and interest groups, but also by a scholarly critique of
the regulatory system that has continued to develop alongside the
political debate. That scholarly critique has coalesced along two distinguishable (but not always distinguished)" dimensions: one that
focuses on the substantive efficiency of regulatory policies, and another that focuses on procedural efficiency, or rather the inefficiencies
that stem from the process by which agencies make policy. The former
critique is led by economists, the latter by public administration
scholars, and both have allies among legal scholars.
The substantive efficiency critique of regulation is long-standing" and well-known, as is the economist's solution for inefficiency:
namely, the replacement of regulatory mandates with market incentives. It says that regulation should be minimally prescriptive, leaving

18. Indeed, Resources for the Future's Paul Portney has labeled these efforts "cartoon reform." See Paul R. Portney, Cartoon Caricaturesof RegulatoryReform, RESOURCES, Fall 1995, at
21. We place the efforts of the Competitiveness Council and some parts of the 1994 House
Republicans' environmental agenda in this category. It is worth noting that some critics of
reform do not make this distinction and/or suspect that most regulatory reform is a disguised
attempt at regulatory relief. See, e.g., Amy Heinzerling, Reductionist Regulatory Reform, 8
FORDHAM ENVTL. J. 459, 460-61 (1997) (coupling the 1994 "Contract with America" with riskbased regulatory reform); Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA
to Conform with the New American Environmentality, 23 COLUMB. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 25-26 (1998)
(describing 1994 House Republicans anti-environmental agenda). Of course, we acknowledge the
existence of good faith arguments that regulatory standards (the ends of regulation) may be
inefficiently stringent from a social welfare point of view. This argument is often associated with
advocacy of risk analysis as a guide to spending on environmental protection. For a good summary of this large literature, see Frank Cross, The Subtle Vices Behind Environmental Values, 8
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 151 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, A Note on "Voluntary" versus "Involuntary"Risks, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLy F. 173 (1997). We do not address those arguments here;
rather, we are concerned only with reform arguments aimed at the means of achieving regulatory goals.
19.The distinction we make here between substantive and procedural efficiency is particularly useful analytically in discussing the problems encountered by current regulatory reform
initiatives. This should become evident as the argument unfolds here. There are reasons,
however, why others may not make this same distinction. In particular, the two critiques
overlap, especially in discussions of the design of regulatory instruments, where criticism of
command and control regulation can be characterized as both a substantive and procedural
critique. In addition, procedural inefficiencies beget substantive inefficiencies, blurring the
distinction in that sense. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
20. See generally A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1924). Most environmental
economics texts contain good descriptions of Pigou's ideas. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL &
WALLACE E. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE (1979);
THOMAS H. TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY (1998); R. KERRY TURNER &
DAVID W. PEARCE, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1990).
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to regulated firms the task of determining the means of compliance
with regulatory limits and goals. That preference for cost-efficiency
has led to sustained criticism of so-called "command and control"
environmental regulation, under which (i) all regulated firms must
meet uniform, technology-based pollution control standards, and (ii)
regulators often specify not only the firm's pollution control goal, but
the means of achieving it as well.2' That is, by specifying how individual firms must contribute to pollution control goals, we make pollution
control unnecessarily costly. This is because command and control
regulation ignores opportunities for two distinct benefits-gains from
technological innovation and gains from trade.
First, leaving the means of pollution control to the discretion of
the firm provides an incentive for firms to develop less costly control
technologies. Conversely, specifying control technologies destroys that
incentive.' EPA regulations are full of examples of prescriptions that
force firms to use inefficient means to achieve a regulatory goal. Perhaps the most frequently-cited testimonial to that fact is the celebrated Yorktown Pollution Prevention Project, a multi-year collaborative effort between the Amoco Oil Company ("Amoco")23 and the EPA
that yielded an agreement to permit Amoco to reduce pollution from
its Yorktown, Virginia refinery using more cost-effective approaches
than those specified in EPA rules.'

21. This literature is far too extensive to summarize here. For good summaries of the argument, see TIETENBERG, supra note 20, at 362-69; TURNER & PEARCE, supra note 20, at 84.
There is also a sizeable body of literature criticizing reliance on uniform standards in the scholarly law journals, though much of that literature focuses on ambient air standards. See, e.g.,
James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal SystemAnd Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226 (1995); James E. Krier, The Irrational NationalAir
Quality Standards:Macro- and MicroMistakes, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 323 (1974).
22. While most federal air and water emissions standards are "technology-based," most of
these standards do not legally require that firms actually use the technology on which the
standard is based. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 60-63 (discussing criteria and standards under the Clean
Air Act), 125, 129 (discussing criteria and standards under the Clean Water Act). Sometimes,
however, permitting agencies do include such specifications in permits. Furthermore, firms may
deem it in their best interests to use the technology in order to minimize the chances of harsh
regulatory treatment in the event of a future problem. Finally, other parts of the federal environmental regulatory structure do specify in detail how firms must accomplish regulatory goals.
See infra the discussion of the Amoco Yorktown facility, in the text accompanying note 24.
23. Amoco Corporation owned Amoco Oil Company, which owned the Yorktown facility.
Recently, Amoco Corporation merged with British Petroleum to form BP Amoco. The facility is
now known as the "BP Amoco Yorktown Refinery."
24. Edward Weber, who has studied the Yorktown Project, described how project participants identified the gains to be had from regulatory flexibility:
[Stakeholders] discovered a number of instances in which regulations were poorly
matched to the emissions profile of the facility. For example, in the particular case of
benzene, . . . EPA rules issued in 1990 required Amoco to build a $31 million watertreatment system to capture benzene vapors emanating from wastewater. But data
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Second, regulators can make pollution control less costly by allowing those firms that can reduce pollution more inexpensively to
bear the lion's share of the control burden. Command and control
regulation may specify that firms A and B must each reduce their
pollution by 10 units. If firm A can reduce pollution at a flat cost of
$10 per unit of pollution while firm B's pollution reduction costs are
$50 per unit, the firms provide 20 units of pollution reduction at a
total cost of $600. However, if firm A provided all 20 units of pollution
reduction, then the cost would be $200. A system of pollution taxes or
marketable permits would allow firms to realize these gains,' and
would provide a further incentive for firms to develop less costly pollution control methods.' Despite some inciemental movement toward
market-based approaches in the first three decades of modern American environmental regulation, we continue to rely mostly on command
and control approaches. Hence, the calls continue for greater substantive efficiency in that regulatory regime.
The procedural efficiency critique is related to, but conceptually
distinct from, the substantive efficiency critique. Since the inception of
the modern environmental movement, the EPA has relied overwhelmingly on rulemaking to make and administer environmental
policy, far more so than most other federal agencies.27 Scholars trace
that predilection to the political environment under which the Agency
was created, noting that modern environmental laws were enacted at

gathered by the [project participants] showed "that EPA's basic assumptions in requiring
such a system... were wrong for this refinery .... " At the same time, the project's monitoring efforts uncovered a far more serious, and unregulated, benzene problem at the refinery's loading docks.... Given the estimated $6 million capital construction cost of controlling barge-loading emissions, the refinery could have saved $25 million while
concurrently cleaning up five times more pollution....
EDWARD P. WEBER, PLURALISM BY THE RULES: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION 201 (1998). For another example of an inefficient mandate, see the discussion of
the Merck facility, infra, note 59 and accompanying text.
25. Of course, under a marketable permit system, firm B would be willing to purchase 10
units of pollution reduction from firm A for some amount greater than or equal to $100. Likewise, at any tax rate greater than $20 per unit of pollution reduced, firm A will choose to reduce
pollution by 20 units (or more) while firm B will choose to pay the pollution tax.
26. It is easy to see how, under either system, firms will try to devise less expensive pollution reduction methods to further reduce their own costs.
27. Some agencies eschew rules, preferring to make decisions on a case-by-case basis. Others adopt broad policies but choose not to promulgate them formally as rules. Of course, the
Administrative Procedures Act requires that all "rules" be promulgated through APA rulemaking
procedures. But as others have noted, many broad policies that appear to meet the definition of
a "rule" under the APA are not formally memorialized as rules. For a discussion of these policymaking options, see Spence, supra note 16, at 428-30. In any case, the EPA's relative preference
for rulemakings has been well chronicled. See, e.g., CORNELIUS KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY (1994).
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a time of heightened concern over the problem of agency capture by
industry.' After a long struggle with industry over the passage of
environmental legislation, environmental interests did not want to see
their victories undone by the Agency.' Consequently, the EPA was
designed specifically to resist that kind of capture.' Even with its
tamper-resistant design, however, EPA policymakers have remained
acutely aware of the possibility that industry nevertheless might
capture the Agency by persuading a sympathetic future President to
appoint Agency leaders who might try to undermine the Agency's
mission."1 Rulemaking is a logical ex ante response to that risk. Memorializing policy choices in regulations makes it more costly for future
agency policymakers to reverse those choices." Indeed, agencies face
the question of whether to memorialize policies in formally promulgated regulations both continually (when facing new policy choices)
and continuously (with respect to each existing informal policy). In
making such decisions, an agency balances the benefits of rulemaking
against the transaction costs. Therefore, the probability that current
policymakers will choose to formalize a policy in the form of a rule is
partly a function of their assessment of future policymakers' hostility
to the policy. Thus, the EPA's attachment to rulemaking is a testament to its (and its environmental constituents')' continuing concern
over possible future capture by industry. '

28. See generallyTHEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1979); MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A
REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1975); RICHARD B. STEWART, THE REFORMATION OF
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1975).

29. Lawrence Susskind and Joshua Secunda contend that the EPA "was designed to carry
out a quasi-military mission." Lawrence Susskind & Joshua Secunda, The Risks and the Advantages of Agency Discretion:Evidence from EPA's Project XL, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 67, 68 (1998/99);
see also ALFRED MARCUS, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE: CHOOSING AND IMPLEMENTING AN

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1980).
30. Thus, the Agency's mission was defined clearly in pro-environmental terms in enabling
legislation, in part to attract environmentally concerned professionals to the Agency, and also to
facilitate legal challenges by environmental interest groups in the event the Agency swayed from
this path in the future. See MARCUS, supranote 29.
31. For a discussion of the dynamics of this avenue of control, and its application to the appointment of a hostile EPA Administrator (Anne Burford) by Ronald Reagan, see Spence, supra
note 16, at 430-32.
32. For an argument to this effect, see, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The Politicsof Structural Choice:
Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy,in ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO
THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 116-53 (Oliver Williamson ed., 1990) [hereinafter Moe, Structural
Choice]; Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 213, 226 (Special Issue 1990). This does not mean, of course, that future agencies cannot
reverse the policy, they can. That is what happened (and what the Supreme Court approved) in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
33. We should note that Congress often specifies that particular policies must be embodied
in formally promulgated rules. This too can be explained as a precautionary device against
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Of course, there are all sorts of other reasons to engage in
rulemaking, not the least of which is the desire to strengthen the
effect of favored policies by giving them the force of law. In addition,
Kenneth Culp Davis has made the case for rulemaking as an objectively superior process, one that maximizes fairness, access, and certainty in administrative law." However, scholars from a variety of
disciplines have identified some of the drawbacks and unintended
consequences of rulemaking as a policymaking device. One group of
critics argues that overuse of rulemaking has slowed agency decisionmaking and has multiplied interest group opportunities to challenge
agency decisions in court, causing an explosion of administrative
litigation and a consequent reordering of administrative priorities.
This, in turn, has made agencies gun-shy and has produced an "ossified" agency decisionmaking process that is less flexible, less rational,
and less effective. 6 Another group of critics argues that rulemaking
necessarily begets certain varieties of substantive inefficiencies because the task of writing an "optimally specific" rule is difficult, if not
impossible." Most of the time, one size does not fit all. For that reason,

capture instigated by environmental interests and their congressional allies. See Moe, Structural Choice, supranote 32.
34. The term "capture" is beginning to fall into disfavor, primarily because it is vague and
because of its conspiratorial or pejorative connotations, which may not be appropriate. For a
discussion of the varieties of capture, see David B. Spence, Agency Discretionand the Dynamics
of ProceduralReform, 59 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 425, 426 (1999).
35. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
36. This argument has sparked a lively debate. See, e.g., SPICER, supra note 15, at 73-76;
Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification:A Harder Look at Agency Policy
Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 667, 676-80 (1996); Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation
and Constraints on Agency Discretion, Unpublished Paper, Florida State University School of
Law, 1999 (on file with authors) (arguing, among other things, that agencies' ability to evade
procedural mandates helps ameliorate the ossification problem); Jody Freeman, Collaborative
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 18 (1997) (arguing that "adversarialism ... has contributed to a rigid rulemaking and implementation process that fails to
encourage creativity, adaptation, and cooperation in solving regulatory problems); Thomas 0.
McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 26 (1998); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some
Thoughts on Deossifying the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Thomas 0.
McGarity, The Courts and the Ossificationof Rulemaking: A Response to ProfessorSeidenfeld, 75
TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent
Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483
(1997); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59,
82-86 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, ConstitutionalMoments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48
STAN. L. REV. 247 (1996) (advocating more adaptive rules).
37. See HOWARD, supra note 1, at 27 ("Once the idea is to cover every situation explicitly,
the words of law expand like floodwaters that have broken through a dike. Rules elaborate on
prior rules; detail breeds greater detail. There is no logical stopping point in the quest for
certainty."); SPICER, supra note 15; Colin Diver, The Optimal Precisionof Administrative Rules,
93 YALE L. J. 65, 76 (1983) ('CThe degree of precision appropriate to any particular rule depends
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crafting a rule that simultaneously provides meaningful guidance to
private sector actors and accommodates the myriad circumstances it
will encounter over the course of its lifetime is a Herculean task, one
that most rule writers fail. The attempt to accommodate specific situations (either at the drafting stage or in subsequent revisions) can
make rules complicated and unwieldy, as the previously cited Yorktown Project illustrates." It is this kind of problem that has led some
scholars to propose that agencies rely minimally on rules and instead
make rules on a case-by-case basis, the way common law "rules"
emerge from a body of case law.39 Others recommend ways to make
rules more adaptable and accommodating, such as writing less specific
rules, authorizing waivers, and the like.4o Indeed, it is this need to
make exceptions to rules that lies at the root of many of the EPA
reform initiatives, a subject to which we turn now.

on a series of variables peculiar to the rule's author, enforcer, and addressee. As a consequence,
generalizations about optimal rule precision are inherently suspect.'); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 1021 (1995) ("A system dedicated to the rule of law is
committed to limiting official discretion, but it is not committed to the unrealistic goal of making
every decision according to judgments fully specified in advance.').
38. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. For an exploration of this phenomenon in
federal regulations, see HOWARD, supra note 1, at 17-18 (describing legal impediments to "sensible" mass transit policy in New York).

39. This is what Michael Spicer proposes. See SPICER, supra note 15. Likewise, Sunstein
prescribes a system of "casuistry" and "privately adaptable rules... that allocate initial entitlements but do not specify end states." Sunstein, supra note 37, at 958. Freeman prescribes
"provisional" rules that allow for adaptation of the rule to new, unforeseen circumstances.
Freeman, supra note 36, at 22.
40. The delegation to an agency of the right to create regulations implies the right to waive
regulations. See WAIT Radio v. F.C.C., 418 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Likewise, the U.S.
Supreme Court has authorized the EPA to grant waivers, absent explicit statutory authority to
do so, in at least one instance. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. N.R.D.C., 470 U.S. 116, 163-65 (1985)
(upholding the EPA's variance program under the Clean Water Act as a reasonable way of
ensuring that the Agency's "necessarily rough-hewn" rules do not impose a hardship on atypical
firms). The Supreme Court's holding that an agency decision not to take enforcement action was
unreviewable sparked a debate over the reviewability of waiver decisions. See Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985). For a good discussion of the legal authority for granting
waivers to rules and the reviewability of waiver decisions, see generally Jim Rossi, Waivers,
Flexibility and Reviewability, 72 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1359 (1997). See also Dennis D. Hirsch, Bill
and Al's XL-ent Adventure: An Analysis of the EPA's Legal Authority to Implement the Clinton
Administration'sProjectXL, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 160-65 (1998) (arguing that the EPA has a
broad implied waiver authority to make exceptions to regulatory requirements); Bradford C.
Mank, The Environmental Protection Agency's Project XL and Other Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Reauthorization,25 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 24-26, 31-34 (1998); Charles
C. Caldart & Nicholas Ashford, Negotiation as a Means of Developing and Implementing Environmental Policy, 22-23 (1998) (unpublished working paper on file with author) (discussing the
legal authority for waiving regulatory requirements in existing environmental statutes, and the
EPA's reluctance to use its waiver authority).
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II. THE BARGAINING SOLUTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

A. BargainingTheory
Of course, microeconomics offers a familiar framework for
analyzing and solving the inefficiency problems facing the regulatory
system. It is a fundamental axiom of neoclassical microeconomics that,
under certain conditions, a Pareto optimal distribution should be
1
achieved through bargaining."
This notion is commonly illustrated
through the use of a so-called "Edgeworth Box."'
FIGURE 1: The Standard Edgeworth
Box Analysis
PERSON B

Amount of
Good 2

B3

Amount of
Good I

PERSON A

41. Indeed, this basic notion underlies the First Fundamental Theorem of welfare economics. Under the First Fundamental Theorem, if a perfectly competitive market exists, then the
competitive market equilibrium is Pareto optimal. A perfectly competitive market economy
exists when: (i) consumers maximize utility and consumer preferences are "convexi' such that the
marginal utility of a good decreases with increasing amounts of the good; (ii) consumer preferences satisfy nonsatiation, i.e., "more is better;" and (iii) there are no "market failures," that is,
markets exist for all goods, there are no externalities, and increasing returns to scale (and
natural monopolies) do not exist. See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 199-200 (1990). See also HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcs: A MODERN
APPROACH 51-52 (1990).

42. This device is named after Francis Ysidro Edgeworth, an English economist. The Edgeworth Box assumes a two person, two-good economy, and uses the microeconomic concept of
"indifference curves" to illustrate why private bargaining among individuals should lead to a
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Consider Figure 1, which depicts the standard Edgeworth Box
bargaining process. Every point in the Box represents a potential
division of the total amount of goods 1 and 2 between persons A and B.
Assume that A's utility increases moving from indifference curve '3 Al
to A3, and that B's utility increases from B1 to B3." It is easy to demonstrate that point y in Figure 1 is not Pareto optimal. Indeed, all the
points in the shaded area represent distributions that are Pareto
superior to y because the parties can move to higher indifference
curves (and greater levels of utility or satisfaction) by voluntarily
engaging in trades that take them into the shaded areas from these
initial distribution points. Given an initial distribution at point y,
trades that place the parties at point z will put each party on a higher
indifference curve. Hence, point z is Pareto superior to point y. In fact,
point z represents a Pareto optimal distribution because it, like all
Pareto optimal distributions within the Edgeworth box, is at a point in
which the indifference curves of A and B are tangent to one another."5
At these points of tangency, any trade that moves one person to a
higher indifference curve will move the other to a lower one. Hence,
these points are Pareto optimal. In this way, bargaining over changes
in the regulatory status quo might also produce Pareto improvements-positive-sum gains-in the regulatory process.

Pareto optimal distribution of goods in the usual case. For a straightforward and fairly thorough
discussion of indifference curves, see VARIAN, supra note 41, at 33-52.
43. Of course, as the name implies, the indifference curve represents the various combinations of goods 1 and 2 between which person A is indifferent. In other words, at every point on
indifference curve Al, person A has the same level of utility as she would at any other point on
that curve. She is indifferent between the various combinations of goods represented by that
curve. In this way, the shape of the curves shows A's marginal rate of substitution between the
two goods, or the rate at which person A is willing to exchange amounts of good 1 for amounts of
good 2, over a range of possible combinations. The marginal rate of substitution is actually the
slope of the indifference curve.
44. Curves that are farther from the origin represent higher levels of utility. Thus, A
would be happier with a distribution on curve A2 than curve Al. In the usual case, indifference
curves look like those shown in Figure 1. That is, they are monotonic, with a decreasing slope as
x (or the amount of good 1 in person A's bundle) increases. This means that over the range of
choice examined, more of each good is better, implying a negative slope to the curve. See VARIAN,
supra note 41, at 44-46. Hence, economists say that "well-behaved" indifference curves are
convex to the origin. Convexity implies that the marginal rate of substitution for a good decreases over increasing amounts of that good. This assumes away the notion of satiation-i.e.,
that there are distributions of goods at which a person may not prefer more of a particular good.
While the assumption of monotonicity assumes away the notion of satiation, the assumption of
convexity reflects the decreasing marginal utility of a good at higher amounts of the good. This
is, of course, true for many goods. See id.
45. This generalization holds true assuming well-behaved preferences for both parties.
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B. BargainingExperiments
The Clinton Administration gave voice to this prescription for
regulatory inefficiency primarily through the Gore Report on "reinventing government," and through subsequent studies and initiatives
to reinvent administration at the federal government level.46 Like the
scholarship that preceded them, these reports concluded that, as a
product, environmental regulation was sometimes too prescriptive and
too detailed, and that those detailed prescriptions sometimes foreclosed opportunities for more efficient and effective ways to achieve
regulatory goals." They urged the EPA to explore the further use of
market incentives and risk-based decisionmaking, as well as opportunities for greater cooperation with states, local governments, citizens and industry.48 For its part, the EPA undertook a series of regulatory initiatives designed to promote pollution reduction by industry49
and to facilitate more cooperative approaches to regulation.' Among
the latter were the four reforms described below, each of which:
(i) embodies a more cooperative, less formal, and less adversarial
approach to regulation as a means to achieve existing environmental
goals more efficiently; (ii) seeks to enable regulators to take advantage
of the specialized knowledge of industry in order to avoid regulatory

46. See GORE, supra note 8. The move to reinvent the EPA was also spurred on by a series
of reports by the National Academy of Public Administration ("NAPA!) that focused exclusively
on reforming environmental regulation. See NAPA, SETTING PRIORITIES, supra note 9; NAPA,
RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supranote 9.
47. See, e.g., GORE, supra note 8, at 138-39 (specifically Recommendations EPA01, EPA02,
and EPA04); NAPA, SETTING PRIORITIES, supranote 9, at 97-104.
48. See NAPA, SETTING PRIORITIES, supra note 9, at 100-104. Indeed, the Gore Report explicitly urged agencies to make more and better use of negotiated rulemaking and other consensus-based processes. See GORE, supra note 8, at 118-19.
49. For analyses of the EPA's voluntary programs, see generally Terry Davies & Jan Mazurek, Industry Incentives for Environmental Improvement: Evaluation of U.S. Federal Initiatives (1996) (on file with the Global Environmental Management Inst.); Michael Gearhart, Case
Studies in the Implementation of Voluntary Environmental Management System Standards,
Resenbaum News & Views available at <http://www.lawinfo.com/law/ca/environmentallaw/
archives/newsv2n2.htm#CaseStudies> and <http://www.lawinfo.com/law/ca/environmentallaw/
archives/Gearhart.htm>; Madhu Rhanna & Lisa Damon, EPA's Voluntary 33/50 Program:
Impact on Toxic Releases and Economic Performance of Firms, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign Environmental and Resource Economics Working Paper #8 (1997); James McCarthy,
Voluntary Programs to Reduce Pollution, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress
(1995).
50. The Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") authorizes the use of negotiated rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994). Shortly after the Gore Report, the President signed Executive Order 12,866, which directed executive branch agencies to explore the use of "consensual
mechanisms for developing regulations" and to use negotiated rulemaking where possible. See
Exec. Order No. 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1993).
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inefficiencies; and (iii) has met with considerable resistance and criticism from opponents of reform.
1. Project XL
The Clinton Administration first announced the Project XL 5'
program in March 1995.2 The program was modeled after the
Amoco/Yorktown example.' The EPA had high ambitions for Project
XL, promising to implement fifty pilot projects by mid-1997.' Under
the program, individual firms could propose changes in the environmental compliance activities at their facilities. The EPA initially
established eight objectives that would guide their selection of projects
for Project XL, representing a combination of environmental, costefficiency and other factors.' Despite high hopes that the program
would provide an avenue for consensus-based, positive-sum change in
environmental policy, the program experienced an early setback on
September 5, 1996, when the sponsor of one of the program's most
promising early proposals-the Minnesota-based 3M Company-notified the EPA that it was withdrawing from the Project XL process. As
late as June 1996, the EPA, 3M, and the state had seemed close to an
agreement on the project, and company representatives seemed confident that the 3M plant was in line to receive the first-ever multimedia
permit.' One of the reasons cited for 3M's withdrawal was a dispute
over whether 3M's proposal would satisfy the Agency's requirement
that XL projects achieve superior environmental performance.5 7

51. In an unfortunate attempt to force an acronym upon a catch-phrase, the "'L" stands for
"eXcellence and Leadership."
52. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (1995).
53. See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
54. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282.
55. Those eight criteria were: (1) superior environmental performance; (2) cost savings; (3)
support of interested stakeholders, including local communities and governments; (4) testing of
new and innovative processes that prevent the generation of pollution; (5) testing of new approaches that could be incorporated into other EPA programs; (6) technical and administrative
feasibility; (7) making information about the project available to interested parties for evaluating
success; and (8) ensuring compliance with Executive Order 12,898 on environmental justice. See
id. at 27,287.
56. See 3M decides to drop out of Project XL process after disagreement over performance
guarantees,27 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 1045, 1046 (1996); Christina M. Buelow, Barriers to Regulatory Reform as Experienced in the 3M Project XL Pilot 18-21 (May 1997) (unpublished Master's
thesis, Duke University) (on file with authors); Alfred Marcus et al., A New Competence in
Environmental Management: Lessons from Project XL in Minnesota, presented at the Wharton
Impact Conference on Environmental Contracting, Philadelphia, PA (1999).
57. 3M proposed reductions in the allowable emission levels under its air permit, a benefit
that participants in the bargaining process appeared to believe satisfied the criterion. Some at
the EPA disagreed, however, apparently because 3M's actual emissions had been below even the

614

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53:599

The 3M experience led the Agency to reevaluate the XL process. In early 1997 the EPA revised its decision criteria by stating that
the Agency would emphasize three factors in deciding whether to
approve an XL proposal in the future: (i) whether the proposal would
achieve superior environmental performance (which the EPA also
defined more precisely); (ii) whether the type of regulatory flexibility
methods proposed were appropriate and might serve as a model for
other projects; and (iii) whether the proposal contained adequate
opportunities for involvement by stakeholders." Since the 1997 notice,
several high-profile companies have secured approval for their XL
proposals. However, progress in the XL program has not kept pace
with expectations. While the program has succeeded in identifying
opportunities for positive-sum change,'5 it appears that only a subset
of those opportunities are being realized. As of September 1999, the
EPA had approved only 14 projects for implementation; in the same
time period, three times as many projects had been rejected or the
from
the projects
had withdrawn
companies
sponsoring
consideration.' Perhaps more importantly, the program has been the
object of some scorn within the Agency,6 ' where its legality and wisdom have been questioned. Environmental interest groups"' and commentators"3 have echoed these concerns, particularly the fear that XL

reduced levels. See Buelow, supra note 56; Marcus, supranote 56. For further discussion of this
issue, see Section IV, infra.
58. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, Notice of Modifications to Project XL, 62
Fed. Reg. 19,872 (1997).
59. In addition to the 3M example, other XL proposals (such as the Berry and Intel projects)
would involve emissions reductions coupled with increased compliance flexibility for industry.
See Project XL, <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/all/homepage>. For an in-depth study of
the Intel proposal, see James Boyd, et al., Intel's XL Permit: A Framework for Evaluation (1998)
(Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 98-11). The Merck XL project addressed a prototypical example of rule-based inefficiency. Under applicable ozone regulations, small changes in
emissions of volatile organic chemicals ("VOCs") at the Merck facility would have triggered costly
permitting requirements, even though the change would not increase ozone concentrations due
to the unusual characteristics of the area (low levels of nitrogen oxides, a necessary precursor of
ozone). See Hirsch, supranote 40, at 143-46.
60. See Project XL, <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/all/homepage>.
61. An internal EPA newsletter quoted an unidentified EPA staffer as saying, 'f it isn't
illegal, it isn't XL." This quotation has been reproduced in a number of places. See, e.g., Rena
Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26
ENVTL. L. REP. 10527 (citing What's Up With Project XL - Week of 3/11/96, Project XL update).
62. See Cindy Skrzycki, CriticsSee a Playgroundfor Polluters in EPA'sXL Plan,THE WASH.
POST, Jan. 24, 1997, at D1 ("Environmental and citizens' groups have their own names for what
the Environmental Protection Agency's Project XL stands for: Instead of EXcellence and Leadership, they call it 'EXtra Leniency'.')
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projects will bring environmental harm, and the concern that the
projects often require variances or exemptions from legal requirements." However, despite a recent groundswell of criticism, the program continues. Indeed, compared to many of the EPA's other reform
initiatives, XL's future seems relatively secure.
2. Negotiated Rulemaking
Negotiated rulemaking can be conceived of as Project XL writ
large, in that it employs the same goals and methods on a broader
scale. While negotiated rulemaking takes place throughout the executive branch, nowhere has it been used as frequently and extensively as
it has at the EPA.' In theory, negotiated rulemaking is designed to
bring stakeholders into the regulation development process earlier, to
promote the sharing of information and perspectives among
stakeholders and the Agency, and thereby to produce better and less
controversial rules.' Given the amount of resources that the EPA
devotes to rulemaking and litigation in defense of its rules, 7 it is not
surprising that the EPA has used negotiated rulemaking frequently.
Indeed, if negotiated rulemaking can produce less controversial rules,
there is good reason to expect that the EPA ought to use the process
frequently. However, despite its eager embrace of negotiated rulemaking, the EPA's experiences with the process have met with a

63. See, e.g., William H. Miller, Washington Wreck, INDUSTRY WK., Aug. 18, 1997, at 116
(concluding that Project XL "has gotten off to a disappointing-some critics would say disastrous-start) For additional discussion of criticisms of the XL program, see infra Section III.
64. See Geltman & Skroback, supranote 18, at 33-34 (contending that Project XL operates
"contrary to" the law); Mank, supra note 40, at 24-28, 70-88 (arguing that the XL program lacks
the statutory authority to waive regulatory requirements, and urging legislative reform to
authorize XL); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The DangerousJourney
from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 134-36 (1998).
65. For a summary of the EPA and other agencies' use of negotiated rulemaking, see generally Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, Appendices A & B (1997). For a summary of the EPA's negotiated
rulemaking experience, see Laura Langbein & Cornelius Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus
Conventional Rulemaking: Claims, Counter-claims, and Empirical Evidence, 6-11 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, George Washington University School of Public Affairs) (on file with
authors).
66. Philip Harter is sometimes cited as the leading force behind the APA's endorsement of
negotiated rulemaking. See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71
GEO. L.J. 1 (1982) (summarizing his arguments in favor of negotiated rulemaking); see also
Freeman, supra note 36, at 33-40.
67. For two good analyses of the litigation process that follows EPA rulemakings, see generally CARY COGLIANESE, CHALLENGING THE RULES: LITIGATION AND BARGAINING IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (Book Manuscript, Harvard University) (1995); ROSEMARY O'LEARY,
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE EPA (1993).
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decidedly mixed reaction. Its critics contend that the process (i) has
not produced better, more widely-accepted regulations; (ii) has not
saved agency resources;' (iii) has not helped the Agency avoid litigation;6' and (iv) represents an abdication of the Agency's decisionmaking responsibilities to private sector participants in the negotiation
process." Its defenders dispute these contentions," and argue that
negotiated rulemaking has produced some benefits that are difficult to
quantify or measure.' Whatever the ultimate verdict, the process of
negotiated rulemaking remains controversial, particularly among
environmental groups.

68. See Coglianese, supra note 65, at 1321 (arguing that there is little or no difference in the
likelihood that a negotiated rule will be challenged in court compared with a traditionally
promulgated rule, and that promulgating negotiated rules consumes no fewer resources than
traditional notice and comment rulemaking); see also Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, Consensual Rulemaking and the Time it Takes to Develop Rules, (paper presented at the Fifth Annual
Conference on Public Management, College Station, TX (Dec. 3-4, 1999)) (unpublished, on file
with authors) (finding that negotiated rulemaking processes have no discernible effect on the
duration of rulemaking proceedings); Caldart & Ashford, supra note 40, at 10-11 (arguing that
negotiated rulemaking has not delivered on its primary promised benefits of reduced rulemaking
time and reduced litigation).
69. See Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supranote 65, at 1321 (concluding that negotiated
rulemaking "actually creates new sources of potential conflict in the regulatory process" by
providing additional opportunities "to disrupt the consensus .... ").
70. See William Funk, BargainingToward the New Millenium: Regulatory Negotiation and
the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1374-86 (1997). For a more detailed
discussion of this issue, see infra Section IV.
71. Langbein and Kerwin offer a defense to many of these criticisms. Based on a survey of
participants in negotiated rulemakings, they conclude that rules selected for negotiated rulemaking tend to be more complex and controversial to begin with, raising the question of whether
comparisons like Coglianese's are fair. See Langbein & Kerwin, supranote 65, at 35. Coglianese
disputes this conclusion. See Coglianese, supra note 65, at 1311-21. Langbein & Kerwin also
find no support in their data for the notion that the EPA abrogates its decisionmaking authority
in negotiated rulemakings. See Langbein and Kerwin, supra note 65, at 35-36.
72. Freeman, for example, argues that negotiated rulemaking cannot be judged fairly according to traditional regulatory goals, such as litigation avoidance. Rather, by allowing participants to "transcend[ ] the public-private divide," the process enables participants and policymakers to discover flexible solutions to problems that they would not have discovered otherwise.
Freeman, supranote 36, at 33-54; see also Philip J. Harter, Fearof Commitment: An Affliction of
Adolescents, 46 DUKE L. J. 1389, 1403 (1997) (arguing that the "rules that emerge through
negotiated rulemaking reflect a shop-floor insight and expertise ... [and they] take account of
issues that would likely escape the attention of an agency in traditional rulemaking."); Langbein
& Kerwin, supra note 65, at 35-36 (contending that the negotiated rulemaking process produces
"better" rules irrespective of the probability of subsequent litigation, because participants are
more satisfied with negotiated rules, and clarify more disputed issues in negotiated rulemak-

ings).
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3. The Common Sense Initiative
Another of the EPA's "flagship" reform initiatives, the Common
Sense Initiative ("CSF'), was designed to bring together representatives of six environmentally significant industrial sectors of the economy: automobile manufacturing, computers and electronics, iron and
steel, printing, metal finishing, and petroleum refining.73 Representatives of individual firms within each sector meet regularly with EPA
representatives and other interested stakeholders to explore opportunities to improve environmental regulation within each sector. More
specifically, each group tries to identify opportunities for changing
unnecessarily complex or inconsistent requirements within the existing regulatory structure. The hope is that by meeting face-to-face
outside of the usual inspection and enforcement context, participants
will be able to identify opportunities for positive-sum improvements in
regulation.74 In the words of the EPA, the CSI approach seeks to move
regulation "from conflict to consensus, from piecemeal to holistic, and
from inflexibility to innovation."75
Since the program was launched in 1994, sector representatives have met on a regular basis. Their initial proposals, called "projects" in CSI parlance, were modest. Most involved relatively small or
incremental changes to the regulatory system, such as the iron and
steel sector committee's proposal to develop a model community relations program for sector firms. 6 The program's modest achievements
have provoked criticism from within and without,7 and led to an EPA-

73. The ongoing progress of the CSI groups is chronicled on the EPA's CSI Web Site. See
EPA, Common Sense Initiative (visited Jan. 16, 2000) <http://www.epa.gov/commonsense/> (CSI

Web Site).
74. See CSI Web Site, <http:llwww.epa.gov/commonsense/>.
75. See CSI Web Site, <http:l/www.epa.gov/commonsense/bckgrd.htm>.
76. See CSI Web Site, <http://www.epa.gov/commonsense/3table.htm> ("Community Involvement Project").
77. See, e.g., Susan Bruninga, Browner Touts Reinvention Progress,Says 50 XL Projects Expected by Late 1999, 28 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 2529-30 (1998) (chronicling some criticisms of the CSI
program); Cheryl Hogue, NAPA Panel Proposes New Law to Allow Rules Integration Under
Existing Statute, 28 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 902, 903 (1997) (quoting the NAPA panel's assertion that
CSI has failed to produce "a bold solution to an environmental problem that can capture the
public's imagination or ignite industry's enthusiasm'); The Federal-StateRelationship:A Look
Into EPA Regulatory Reinvention Efforts Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. On Commerce, 105th Cong. 34 (1997) (prepared statement of Russell J.
Harding, Director, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality) (calling his state's experience with CSI "very disappointing," and attributing the program's failures to the EPA's "decision
to base all actions and decisions on the concept of stakeholder consensus.') The General Accounting Office has also criticized CSI. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY SERIES: MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM RISKS--EPA
(GAO/OCG-99-17) (Jan. 25, 1999); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
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sponsored review of CSI in 1997."' Since that review, CSI committees
have set their sights on more fundamental changes. The first sectorwide CSI agreement was reached among participants in the metal
finishing sector group. The agreement commits members of the industry to a series of toxics-use reduction efforts and "beyond compliance"
performance targets, in exchange for removal of certain specific regulatory barriers to efficient compliance.' Despite this change in focus
within CSI, however, the program has not met its proponents' initially
high expectations, and the EPA has decided to merge the program into
another industrial sector-based regulatory program.'
4. The Environmental Leadership Program
Despite its promise, the Environmental Leadership Program
("ELP") has remained one of the EPA's lesser-known reform initiatives. The original aim of the ELP was to identify companies with
particularly sophisticated and successful environmental management
programs ("environmental leaders"), and to harness the knowledge
that those firms could bring to the task of environmental compliance
to benefit others. In 1994, the EPA invited proposals for pilot projects
from environmental leaders in the private sector.81 In 1995, the EPA
selected twelve well-known, large companies with considerable environmental compliance experience for participation in the program. ' As
originally conceived, the program was to have had several phases, the
first of which involved information sharing between teams of representatives from each company, representatives of the EPA, and, in
some cases, other stakeholders. In this way, regulators could gain

CHALLENGES FACING EPA's EFFORTS TO REINVENT ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (GAO/RCED-

97-155) (July 2, 1997). EPA Administrator Carol Browner defends CSI, but admits that CSrs
lessons have not been integrated into the EPA's daily operations. Browner Announces New
Phase of CSI, Wants Thorough Use of Sector Approach, 28 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 2310, 2310 (1998).
78. See EPA, COMMON SENSE INITIATIVE UPDATE (Mar, 1997); Common Sense Initiative
Considers Involvement in Broader Environmental Issues, 28 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 2177 (Feb. 28,
1997).
79. See CSI Web Site, supra note 73, at <http:l/www.epa.gov/commonsense/CSIsect.html>
("Promoting Improved Performance Flexible Track Project (Metal Finishing 2000)').
80. The EPA is folding the work of CSI into something called the Standing Committee on
Sectors of the National Advisory Council on Environmental Policy and Technology. See Susan
Bruninga, Multi-Stakeholder Process Applauded; Improvements Needed, CSI Council Told, 29
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 1702, 1702 (1999).
81. See Environmental Leadership Program: Update, 59 Fed. Reg. 4066 (January 28, 1994);
Environmental Leadership Program: Request for Pilot Project Proposals, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,062
(June 21, 1994).
82. See EPA, Environmental Leadership Program,<http://es.epa.gov/elp/pilots.html>.
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access to companies' expertise and companies could build trust with
regulators.
The ELP pilot projects moved forward in 1995 and 1996. While
the particular approaches of each individual project team varied,
many spent their time conducting detailed environmental audits of
the participating firms' facilities, and reviewing the firms' environmental management systems? As a condition for this sharing of information, the EPA promised not to bring enforcement actions against
the companies for violations identified during the course of these
reviews, so long as the violations were corrected promptly.'
The primary goals of ELP Phase I were to identify innovative
environmental management techniques used by participating firms,
and to explore ways in which those techniques could be made available to other, less sophisticated companies. An additional purpose of
Phase I was to explore ways in which the EPA could extend the ELP
process beyond the original 15 participants.' By most accounts, Phase
I was a success in that it helped the EPA to identify innovative approaches to environmental management, and built trust between EPA
representatives and the participating firms.' Relatively few compliance violations were discovered during the environmental audits
performed during Phase I, and all were corrected in a timely manner."
Phase I was less successful in identifying ways in which the EPA
could extend the ELP approach more broadly, and the participants
have been unable to come to any consensus about other ways of extending the program further. As of this writing, the program is "on
hold."'

83. See Kira A. Jacobs, The Environmental Leadership Program: A Case Study of an EPA
Pilot Project 14-17 (1997) (unpublished Master's Project, Duke University Nicholas School of the
Environment) (on file with authors); Companies Might See Fewer Inspections, FasterPermitting
Under EPA Initiative, 26 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 1289, 1289 (Dec. 1, 1995) (Companies Might See
Fewer Inspections); Innovative Initiative to Provide FacilitiesRelief Headed for Launch in 1997,
ProgramChief Says, 27 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 1347, 1347 (Oct. 18, 1996) (Innovative Initiative).
84. See Enforcement: Inspections at Plants to be Suspended in Environmental Leadership
Pilot Program, 25 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 2448 (Apr. 14, 1995); Jacobs, supra note 83, at 3; Innovative
Initiative, supranote 83; CompaniesMight See Fewer Inspections, supra note 83.
85. See Innovative Initiative, supra note 83; Jacobs, supra note 83, at 3-5; EPA, Environmental Leadership Program, <http://es.epa.gov/elp/pilots.html>.
86. The program director pronounced the pilot phase a success. See Innovative Initiative,
supra note 83, at 1347; see also Jacobs, supranote 83, at 46-47.
87. The discovery of these violations in the facilities of environmentally sophisticated firms
who had advance notice of the audits seems to underscore the difficulty of maintaining perfect
regulatory compliance.
88. See EPA, Environmental Leadership Program, <http://es.epa.gov/elp/>. The EPA has
repeatedly postponed the date for launching the next, broader phase of the program, and the
program's fate is in the hands of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. See
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C. Regulatory Reform at a Crossroads
It seems clear that none of these initiatives has produced the
kind of widespread efficiency improvements that might have been
expected based upon bargaining theory, though that may be an unrealistic goal in the contentious, polarized world of environmental policymaking. In each of these examples, the EPA was able to bring industry and environmental interests (from inside and outside the
Agency) together to share information and to seek positive-sum
change through consensus. However, consensus was not always forthcoming, even in support of what appear to be clear Pareto improvements. No doubt, critics of reform are at least partially correct when
they ascribe the disappointing performance of the EPA reforms to
legal and political impediments. That is, some regulatory reforms do
run up against statutory and other legal constraints, and those constraints certainly do reflect policy values other than cost-effectiveness
and flexibility. Legal impediments are only part of the story, however.
Rather, the better part of the explanation is political-and logical. The
next Section examines arguments raised by the anti-reform constituency, then looks behind those arguments to explore the logical and
strategic reasons why important stakeholders might oppose efficiency
improvements.
III. BARGAINING, COLLABORATION, AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
A. The Critiqueof Reform
In recent years, defenders of traditional regulatory approaches
have answered the pro-reform critique with their own vigorous critique of reform generally, and of cooperative approaches to regulation
in particular. Their critique boils down to two basic and overlapping
arguments. The first challenges the goals of regulatory reform, particularly its emphasis on "efficiency" as an evaluative criterion for
regulation. It argues that the very inefficiencies about which reform
advocates complain serve other important purposes that trump the
goal of efficiency. The second argument is that by seeking new ways to
integrate stakeholders into the policy process, cooperative regulation
amounts to an abdication of decisionmaking responsibility by regula-

Cheryl Hogue, Targeted Violations, Audit Policy Review Among EPA's 1998 Activities, Officials
Say, 28 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 1769, 1769 (Jan. 16, 1998).

2000]

BARGAINING THEORY & REGULATORY REFORM

621

tory agencies. Critics of reform contend (or fear) that these collaborative processes are leading the EPA to cede its authority to stakeholder
groups, thereby elevating the interests of these ad hoc groups over the
public interest. The proponents of each of these arguments see regulatory reform as undermining the rule of law, and contend that traditional means of making law-statutes and regulations-better reflect
these important values than the collaborative and/or ad hoc decisionmaking processes used in the EPA's various reform initiatives.
1. At What Price Efficiency?
Even if the EPA's reform initiatives were to achieve their twin
goals of substantive and procedural efficiency, one might ask whether
those goals are worth pursuing or, more specifically, whether the
pursuit entails unacceptable costs. Defenders of traditional regulation
contend that each of these goals holds a relatively low place in the list
of environmental regulatory priorities, and for good reason. With
respect to substantive inefficiencies, there are reasons why environmental interests might sincerely prefer regulation that is relatively
cost-inefficient. After all, say defenders of traditional approaches, the
primary goal of the current system is not cost-efficiency, but rather
environmental protection. Hence, we ought to be careful about modifying the system, particularly in ways that divert the focus from that
central goal or elevate other goals, like efficiency or flexibility, to an
equal station." Indeed, environmental interests argue that certain
inefficient attributes of regulation-like technology-based standardsare easier to enforce than more efficient alternatives.' This has long
been a central pillar in the case against reform. Environmental interests may also fear that efficiency and flexibility improvements are a
Trojan horse bearing hidden environmental costs. Several commentators have lamented that while EPA reforms may yield overall environmental gains, they may also allow specific environmental losses in
the context of those overall gains.9" There is a general suspicion that

89. This theme runs throughout several of the critiques of regulatory reform. See, e.g.,
Steinzor, supra note 64, at 105 (stressing the need to remain cognizant of the EPA's "overarching
mission" of environmental protection); Heinzerling, supra note 18, at 460 ("[Ihe express purpose
of the laws regulating pollution in this country is the protection of human health and natural
resources.").
90. See generally ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY. 161 (1992); see also Mank, supranote 40, at 4.
91. This is analogous to the argument that using marketable permits to regulate air pollution can create "hotspots" of concentrated emissions. See Steinzor, supra note 64, at 112, 115,
131-35 (making a similar argument in connection with Project XL).
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reform in the name of efficiency may bring laxity.92 Thus, critics of
reform argue, statutory admonitions compelling inefficient regulation
reflect, at least in part, a social choice in favor of giving priority to
these other goals, even at the cost of substantive inefficiency. 3
Critics of reform also challenge reformers' concern with, and
prescription for, procedural inefficiencies. The critics' argument tracks
closely the original justification for using rules, and reflects a continuing concern with the problem of regulatory capture. That concern,
in turn, stems from a deep suspicion of the motives and trust4
worthiness of business participants in collaborative policy processes."
Rena Steinzor, for example, sees virtue in the "transparency" of rules.
Rules enable environmental interests to know with greater certainty
what the law is, and what it requires.95 By introducing the possibility
of individual variances into the regulatory process-indeed, by promoting that possibility-reform initiatives make it more difficult for
environmental groups to keep track of the legal requirements to which
regulated firms are subject.' Environmental groups' relative resource
disadvantages exacerbate the problem," making it difficult for national environmental groups to monitor developments in a more decentralized regulatory process." Critics of reform note also that rules
promote objectivity by treating regulated firms equally.99 By institutionalizing departures from rules, even in the name of efficiency improvements, reform increases the opportunity for regulated firms to

92. See id.; see also Mank, supranote 40, at 4-10 (summarizing these arguments).
93. This is part of the argument raised in opposition to regulation based on risk. For a survey of that literature, see, e.g., Cross, supranote 18; Heinzerling, supra note 18.
94. Steinzor, for example, argues that industry's professions of support for environmental
protection are usually disingenuous, and systematically so. See Steinzor, supra note 64, at 15662.
95. See id. at 135.
96. Steinzor says that in this way Project XL promotes a "regulatory free for all." See id. at
138.
97. For a detailed treatment of interest group theories of environmental politics, see Daniel
A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in EnvironmentalLaw, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 60-61 (1992);
David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the Foundationsof Environmental Law in
the 21st Century, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 149-50, 168-71 (1995).
98. This is a problem primarily for individual national environmental groups trying to keep
track of, or participate in, individual bargaining processes. Local environmental groups are often
included in XL negotiations and negotiated rulemaking sessions as well. Steinzor claims that
local environmental groups lack the sophistication to hold their own in the XL process. See
Steinzor, supra note 64, at 180 ("[Local citizen activists ... lack confidence in their ability to
negotiate with experts in regulatory debates... [and] are forced to rely on an intuitive sense of
which players are trustworthy in [disputes], recognizing that their intuitions can fail.').
99. See Steinzor, supra note 64, at 135.
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subvert the regulatory process-that is, to capture it." °° Only rigorous
transparent standards, say critics of reform, can prevent regulatory
capture and adequately protect the environment.'O
2. Reform as Abdication
The specter of regulatory capture also hangs over the second
general argument raised against reform: namely, the argument that
collaborative policy processes represent a de facto cession of EPA
decisionmaking authority to private parties."' According to this view,
collaborative processes lack legitimacy for a variety of reasons. First,
reform initiatives that are designed to promote collaboration and
cooperation between private stakeholders assume an interest group
bargaining model of the policy process.' 3 In so doing, the initiatives
ignore the notion of a "public interest" apart from the collision of private interests. 4 Perhaps the most vigorous proponent of this view is
William Funk, who sees some collaboration-based reforms as "perversions" of the public interest.' 5 He argues that the primary purpose of
administrative law is to promote the rule of law, and that agencies'
actions are justified and legitimized by their faithfulness to statutory

100. That concern over capture lies at the core of Steinzor's argument seems clear, even if
she does not use the term "capture" to describe her concerns. See id.; see also, Funk, supra note
70, at 1383-85.
101. See Steinzor, supranote 64, at 182.
102. Advocates of this view include Funk, supra note 70; see generally Stephen H. Linder,
Deconstructing the Public-Private Partnership, (unpublished paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Ass'n, Boston, MA (Sept. 3-6, 1998)); see also Steinzor,
supra note 64, at 104 (seeming to endorse this view when she calls consensus-based regulation
"self-regulation); but see id. at 197 n.306 (acknowledging that the EPA retains final decisionmaking authority under these collaborative processes). For a good summary of the abdication
argument in a larger theoretical context, see Freeman, supranote 36, at 82-90 (noting that fears
of collusion and capture sometimes drive this argument).
103. For a good discussion of the relevance of interest group bargaining models of politics to
the environmental policy process preceding the literature on regulatory reform, see Daniel A.
Farber, ContractLaw and Modern Economic Theory, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 306-10 (1983). For
a discussion of why we believe bargaining models illuminate the debate over regulatory reform,
see infra text accompanying note 195.
104. This view implicitly assumes the existence of a "public interest" apart from the pull and
tug of private interests, contrary to the views of most law and economics scholars who, citing
Kenneth Arrow, dispute the notion of the "public interest." For a discussion of public interest
model of administration and its relationship to "the Arrow problem," see Spence, supra note 16,
at 408-15, 443-46. For a more detailed discussion of how consensus-based reform implicates
these issues, see infra Section V.
105. Funk, supra note 70, at 1374 (arguing that the APA "reflects the notion of an agency
acting consequentially, not politically, in an exercise of instrumental rationality," and that
consensus-based processes contradict that notion).
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directives."° This view contends that group consensus is a poor substitute for statutory authority as the basis for legitimacy. Indeed, collaborative policies stray even further from traditional sources of legitimacy by viewing statutory directives as impediments to, or constraints on, policymaking.1 7 This substitution contradicts the notion of
the "agency as sovereign decision-maker.""' Several commentators
also have implied that it raises potential constitutional problems
under the nondelegation doctrine.1"
A second, closely-related criticism is that collaborative processes lack legitimacy because they almost invariably omit important
interests from the bargaining table. This has been a persistent criticism of negotiated rulemaking in particular.1 . and of Project XL as
well."' Because environmental problems are complex and implicate
many diverse interests, it is often impossible to convene all important
stakeholders in negotiation meetings. This, in turn, raises the possibility of collusion between the Agency and included interests (presumably industry) at the expense of excluded interests.1 " As a result,

106. See id. Other commentators go further, seeming to take offense at the very notion that
an agency might waive a rule in any given circumstance. Marianne Lavelle, for example, calls
Project XL a "wink and a nod" arrangement, and describes the program this way: "AnheuserBusch Co., Inc., 3M Co. and a handful of other corporations want the opportunity to break some
federal laws in the coming months. And surprisingly, the federal government has offered its
blessing." See Marianne Lavelle, Bending the Rules, NAT'L L. J., June 10, 1996, at Al.
107. Funk argues that while the APA has "accommodated" negotiated rulemaking, "it has
done so in an insidious way, by having agency preamble writers make up rationalizations for
decisions made on other grounds." See Funk, supra note 70, at 1374. This process, he says,
"masks the reality of bargained for exchanges." Id. at 1375; see also Freeman, supra note 36, at
82 (giving a dispassionate summary of the legitimacy critique of collaborative approaches to
policymaking, including Funk's argument).
108. Funk, supra note 70, at 1377; cf. Steinzor, supra note 64, at 197 n.306 (criticizing collaborative processes seems to acknowledge that the EPA retains final decisionmaking authority
over policy choices); see also Freeman, supranote 36, at 87 (agreeing with Steinzor and contradicting Funk's view). For an interesting discussion of this issue in a larger context, see Jim
Rossi, ParticipationRun Amok The Costs of Mass Participationfor DeliberativeDecisionmaking,
92 Nw. U. L. REV. 174, 203-5 (1997); see also our discussion of Rossi's view of collaborative
policymaking in this context, infra note 198.
109. See Freeman, supra note 36, at 82 (discussing the "subdelegation" issue generally);
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 16, at 1210 (raising potential issues).
110. See Coglianese, supra note 65, at 1321-24 (arguing that disputes over who participates
in negotiations make negotiated rulemakings more conflictual than traditional rulemakings);
Rose-Ackerman, supranote 16, at 1210;.
111. See Steinzor, supranote 64, at 180.
112. See Freeman, supra note 36, at 83 (discussing this issue); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaborationas the Basis for Flexible Regulation, __ WM. &
MARY L. REV. __, 113-20 (2000) (arguing that Project XL stakeholder groups exclude important
interests). For a particularly skeptical view of business-government collaboration, including in
the environmental context, see Linder supra note 102, at 2 ('The idea of government and business partnering for some common purpose.., seems to draw on communal traditions of coopera-
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omitted interests see the process as illegitimate, or at least less legitimate than traditional regulatory policymaking methods.'
In sum, the defense of the traditional regulatory system and
corresponding critique of reform is picking up steam. The next subsection offers a framework for evaluating the progress of collaborationbased reform initiatives, one that also sheds some light on the debate
over those initiatives.
B. StrategicBargainingas an Impediment to Reform
1. Two Views of the Bargaining Process
We have suggested that the Edgeworth Box can be used to
analyze bargaining conflicts in the context of regulatory reform. Indeed, it is common to conceive of laws and policies in this way," and
many of the EPA's reforms seek to facilitate exactly this kind of bargaining. Thus, reconceiving regulatory reforms in these terms may
shed some light on the debate. Figure 2 illustrates one view of bargaining over regulatory reform, one we might ascribe to proponents of
reform.
In Figure 2, the "goods" at issue are attributes of regulation:
namely, the legally mandated total amount of pollution reduced on the
x-axis, and the mandated cost per unit of pollution reduced on the yaxis."5 We can think of the y-axis as representing the means of environmental regulation, or legal mandates about how to reduce pollution, that is, the substantive or cost-efficiency of regulation. The x-axis
represents the ends, or legal mandates about how much to reduce
pollution. In Figure 2, conflict on the x-axis is a zero-sum conflict, in
that we typically expect industry and environmental interests to clash
over the question of how much to reduce pollution. However, in Figure
2, proponents of reform do not necessarily conceive of conflict on the yaxis as zero-sum. While industry presumably desires greater effi-

tion that are, at once, vaguely familiar and socially valued. Of course, when we scratch the
surface of these arrangements .... the spectacle of machine politics of graft and corruption shine
through.).
113. See Coglianese, supra note 65, at 1321 (arguing that this dynamic encourages omitted
interests "to disrupt the consensus").
114. See Farber, supranote 103, at 306-10
115. Of course, most pollution control laws do not specify directly how costly pollution control
must be, but they sometimes do so indirectly by specifying how emissions goals must be met.
Indeed, many of the EPA's regulatory reform initiatives are aimed at overcoming or changing
mandates that require inefficient means to reach agreed-upon ends. See supra Section II for a
discussion of this.
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ciency, proponents of reform might believe that environmental interests should not view greater efficiency for industry with disfavor.11 We
might infer from the various efficiency critiques that proponents of
reform believe that environmental interests care, or ought to care,
only about the amount of pollution controlled and not about the costper-unit-controlled borne by industry. Thus, in Figure 2 we depict
industry's indifference curves to reflect that view of the conflict.117

FIGURE 2: Edgeworth Box Analysis of
Regulatory Reform Bargaining--industry View
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Given an initial policy at point u, industry and environmental
interests alike ought to prefer any point in the shaded area to u. Indeed, we would expect that bargaining between industry and environmental interests would leave them somewhere on the line that
runs between x and z, which represents the set of maximally efficient
(and Pareto optimal) policies. The EPA's incentives-based regulatory

116. In fact, environmental groups have not spoken with one voice on this issue in the past.
Unlike most other environmental interest groups, the Environmental Defense Fund, for example, has long advocated efficiency improvements in regulation, including the use of incentivesbased regulation. See, e.g., S02 TradingProgram Offers Answers for Other Pollution Problems,
Group Says, 28 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 1408 (Nov. 21, 1997).
117. That is, environmental interests' indifference curves are vertical, reflecting the assumption that environmental interests would be unwilling to trade any amount of pollution control for
"gains" on the y-dimension. In Figure 2, industry cares about both "goods," while environmental
interests' utility is a function only of gains on the x-dimension (amount of pollution controlled).

2000]

BARGAINING THEORY& REGULATORYREFORM

627

programs and many of its reform initiatives are designed to produce
just that kind of movement into Pareto superior outcomes.1 18 Yet,
policy proposals that seem to fit this description have not found their
way into existing laws, and have been rejected by the EPA and
stakeholders under the Agency's regulatory reform initiatives. 19' Given
the bargaining environment depicted in Figure 2, it is easy to see why
proponents of reform find this result inexplicable.
Critics of reform respond that opposition to efficiency improvements is not surprising at all because Figure 2 does not accurately represent bargaining over environmental policy generally.
Defenders of traditional regulation appear to posit a bargaining environment more like that depicted in Figure 3, in which bargaining in
both dimensions (over how much to reduce pollution, and over how to
reduce pollution) is zero-sum bargaining. In other words, in Figure 3,
environmental interests sincerely prefer inefficient regulation to efficient regulation, perhaps because they see the inefficiency of regulation as inextricably intertwined with other valued attributes of the
regulation.'

FIGURE 3: Edgeworth Box Analysis of Regulatory
Reform Bargaining--Environmental Intarests* View
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118. Of course, Project XL offers a structured process that attempts to identify Pareto superior policies compared with the status quo. Likewise, we can think of negotiated rulemaking as
an attempt to find policies that are Pareto superior to those that would have been adopted under
traditional notice and comment rulemaking.
119. See the discussion supra Section II.B.1.
120. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
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In that case, we ought not expect necessarily that such bargaining will result in cost-efficient regulation. 1 For example, if environmental interests believe that incentives-based regulation is inherently more difficult to monitor and enforce than technology-based
regulation, then they may resist movement to the more efficient
means not because they object to efficiency, but rather because efficiency cannot be separated from other dimensions of the problem.
Likewise, national environmental groups may view ostensible efficiency improvements in zero-sum terms because (i) they cannot adequately monitor the bargaining processes, (ii) they fear that the proposal may be a Trojan horse carrying unseen environmental harm,
and (iii) they cannot trust local environmental groups to represent
their interests.
We find many of these arguments against the use of collaborative processes to identify positive-sum policy changes to be unpersuasive and/or incomplete. First, none of these arguments explain
problems with negotiated rulemaking, which is merely one way of
developing a broad-based rule, or of establishing the status quo policy.
While the process may be less accessible or more difficult to monitor
than traditional notice and comment rulemaking,"2 the product is not.
While the process is resource-intensive, groups may or may not choose
to participate in the early stages of negotiated rulemaking, and forfeit
no rights to comment or to litigate by opting out of the negotiation
process.
Second, the monitoring argument seems predicated on the assumption that national environmental groups are the only competent
or trustworthy guardians of the public interest. The EPA has designed
and implemented most of its consensus-based regulatory reforms so as
to ensure that other environmental interests, such as state regulators
and local citizens' groups, are well represented in the process. Indeed,
given the strength of environmental interests within the Agency itself,
it seems unlikely that environmentally harmful changes to the status
quo will slip into effect unnoticed. Thus, the argument that regulatory

121. The Edgeworth Box analysis still predicts that the outcome will be Pareto optimal.
However, if environmental interests value less efficient regulation, then their indifference curves
will not be perpendicular to the x-axis (as in Figure 2), and we ought not to expect a corner
solution.
122. Cary Coglianese has shown that participation in negotiated rulemaking is resourceintensive, which means that environmental groups face a relative disadvantage in the process
compared to better-heeled industry groups. See Coglianese, supra note 65, at 1329. However,
since negotiated rules must navigate the notice and comment process anyway, they offer the
same opportunities for input as other rules, and are no less transparent.
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reforms allow business to disguise environmentally harmful changes
as Pareto improvements looks like a red herring.
Third, the argument that technology-based standards are easier to enforce has been eclipsed by advancements in monitoring technologies"n and increasingly cooperative and open business approaches
to environmental compliance.' As self-reporting of violations becomes
more routine' and monitoring becomes easier, there is less of a tradeoff between regulatory flexibility and regulatory transparency. For
that reason, regulation that prescribes inefficient control technologies
makes even less sense now than ever before.
However, there is another possible explanation for why-bargaining may not produce Pareto improvements, one that comes from
the experimental literature on bargaining. Experimental economists
have found that simulations of Edgeworth Box bargaining often do not
produce Pareto optimal outcomes.' To the contrary, players in twoperson bargaining games often forgo clear Pareto improvements; 7 the
common supposition is that such refusals are traceable to one or both

123. For example, in the case of air emissions, there are now continuous emission monitors
("CEMs") that use lasers to measure the opacity of plumes coming out of a plant stack. The
readings produced by these monitors are more frequent and, in many cases, more reliable than
the estimates prepared by even the best-trained professionals using human measurement
methods. In addition to CEMs, there are often physical process parameters related to plant
emissions-such as the temperature, pressure, and speed of gas flows-that can be used to
reliably estimate plant emissions of certain pollutants. See George Van Cleve & Keith W.
Holman, Promise and Reality in the Enforcement of the Amended Clean Air Act Part ." EPA's
"Any Credible Evidence" and "ComplianceAssurance Monitoring"Rules,27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10097
(1997).
124. The last decade has brought a sea change in industry relationships with outside groups
who are interested in environmental compliance issues. Spurred in part by right-to-know laws,
their own changing attitudes toward pollution regulation, and EPA policies promoting openness,
more and more companies are institutionalizing information sharing relationships with citizens'
groups. For a sampling of the extensive multi-disciplinary literature discussing this trend, see
generally THE GREENING OF AMERICAN BUSINESS: MAKING BOTTOM-LINE SENSE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY (Thomas F.P. Sullivan, ed., 1992); BEYOND COMPLIANCE: A
NEW INDUSTRY VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENT, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Bruce Smart ed.,
1992); Mark A. Cohen et al., Environmental and Financial Performance: Are They Related?,
(unpublished paper, Vanderbilt University (1995)) (on file with authors); Douglas J. Lober,
Evaluatingthe EnvironmentalPerformance of Corporations,8 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 184 (1996);
Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995); Geltman & Skroback, supra note 64.
125. For a discussion of self-reporting of environmental violations, see Spence, supranote 97,
at 167.
126. For a summary of this literature, see KREPS, supranote 41, at 551-73.
127. A typical experiment requires players to agree on how to divide a dollar provided by the
experimenter. It is not atypical for players to refuse to accept divisions proposed by the other
player (and therefore to receive nothing rather than something). See generally Alvin E. Roth &
Francoise Schoumaker, Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 362 (1983).
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players' belief that the proposed division of the gains was "unfair."'
Players recognize that each has the power to deny the other desired
gains; that is, each can veto potential changes from the status quo.'
Thus, each player tries to use that veto power to extract as many
gains as possible from the opponent, resulting in competition to see
which player can improve her relative position the most. If one player
believes that the other's offer is not reasonable or fair, that player may
refuse the offer even if it represents a Pareto improvement."
In the context of regulatory reform, environmental interests
may veto proposed positive-sum changes in the status quo (such as
reductions in the cost of compliance coupled with modest pollution
reductions) based on the belief that industry has not done enough to
control pollution, or that polluting behavior is morally wrong. That is,
environmentalists may view the status quo as both inadequate and, in
a sense, illegitimate. They may view the status quo as a stepping
stone to a more stringent future policy. This view is evident in the rich
history of citizen suit litigation brought by environmental groups to
force the EPA to tighten environmental standards."1 It is also why
environmental laws are sometimes called "aspirational."32 Not only do
they set extraordinarily ambitious goals," but the major pollution
control statutes also are designed to move policy toward those goals by
producing ever more stringent pollution control limits in selfexecuting ways." Similarly, the long history of struggle to establish
128. For a more recent discussion of this issue, see KREPS, supra note 41, at 556
("[Blargaining outcomes depend upon individuals' expectations as to what the outcomes should
be.'); Ido Erev & Alvin E. Roth, PredictingHow People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in
Experimental Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 848, 848-50
(1998).
129. In the literature on bargaining games, this is called the "bilateral monopoly" problem.
130. This is precisely what Ochs and Roth found in a series of experiments in which players
sometimes chose to receive nothing rather than to acquiesce to a division of gains that seemed
unfair. See J. Ochs & Alvin E. Roth, An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining,79 AM.
ECON. REV. 355, 365-66, 373 (1989).
131. For a good history of the use of citizen suits in this way, see ROSEMARY O'LEARY,
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (1993).
132. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 141-42 (2d ed., 1994).
133. For a basic discussion of the ambitious and unattained goals of the 1970 Clean Air Act
and the 1972 Clean Water Act, see Robert V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:
LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 763-65, 866-68 (2d ed., 1996).
134. The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act establish standards for limiting air and water emissions, respectively, that are defined in relative terms: that is, relative to the mean. For
example, certain new sources of air pollution must employ "best available control technology" to
control their emissions. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1995); see also id. § 7501(3) (other technologybased standards under the Clean Air Act, including the Lowest Achievable Emission Rate
("LAER") standard). Similarly-defined technology-based standards apply to emitters of water
pollutants. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994). In this way, technological innovation affects de facto
changes in the regulatory standards without formal changes in the law.
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the status quo policy may contribute to the sense that the policy lacks
democratic legitimacy.'35 Environmental groups' may suspect that
industry can manipulate the policy process in unseen ways, and that
they may be forced in the end to accept grudgingly a policy they deem
inadequate.
For all these reasons, we might expect environmental interests
to demand a high price for the efficiency improvements industry
seeks, thus granting industry regulatory flexibility only in exchange
for significant environmental improvements. If environmental interests inside or outside the EPA deem insufficient the ostensible environmental improvements industry offers, or those interests view the
pollution reductions that industry offers as something for which they
ought not to have to pay (in the form of compliance cost reductions),"
they will refuse the deal. This appears to be what happened in connection with 3M's XL proposal. 37 Certainly the long history of distrust
between industry and environmental interests feeds this dynamic in
ways that interfere with positive-sum change.'38
2. The Implications of Strategic Bargaining for Reform
Returning to Figures 2 and 3, we might infer that Figure 2 reflects environmental interests' sincere preferences while Figure 3
represents their strategic posture. 3 It is impossible to know with
certainty whether environmental interests' opposition to reform is
sincere, strategic, or some combination of the two. However, conceiving of the bargaining process in this way reveals some interesting
implications for the bargaining process, and may help explain the
trajectory of regulatory reform initiatives to date.
First, the bargaining model implies that environmental interests may view site-specific bargaining with individual firms (as in the

135. For a more thorough explanation of this idea, see generally Spence, supranote 97.
136. Indeed, there is a rich literature supporting the view that pollution is wrong and ought
not to be commoditized. See id. at 158-63.
137. See infra notes 159-164 and accompanying text.
138. See supranotes 28-34 and accompanying text.
139. This is akin to the notion of "nonseparable" or "conditional" preferences, which social
scientists have studied in other contexts. See, e.g., Dean Lacy & Emerson M.S. Niou, Nonseparable Preferences, Issue Linkage, and Economic Sanctions, (unpublished paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Mass., (Sept. 3-6, 1998))
(on file with authors). Here, we might hypothesize that environmental interests' de facto
preferences are strategic and guide their behavior, even if their sincere preferences would not
lead them to oppose efficiency improvements. That is, they would not object to efficiency improvements but for the fact that objecting permits them to extract highly-valued gains from
industry. In that way their preferences over outcomes on the efficiency dimension are conditioned by their preferences over outcomes on the pollution reduction dimension.
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Project XL context) differently than bargaining over broad policy
choices (as in the negotiated rulemaking context). In the former situation, we might expect participants in the process to be able to get a
sense of the amount of pollution reduction gains that they can extract
from individual firms in exchange for efficiency improvements. As a
consequence, we might expect these smaller bargaining groups to
reach consensus more readily than larger groups. On the other hand,
if environmental interests use bargaining to try to extract the maximum possible pollution reduction gains from firms in return for efficiency improvements, that process will be extremely difficult in any
negotiation that involves multiple firms, such as a negotiated rulemaking. Indeed, the task of agreeing on a policy change (in other
words, writing a rule) that extracts the maximum possible gains from
each firm confronts the already-familiar procedural inefficiency problems inherent in the rule writing process. ""
Second, this view of bargaining suggests another, competing
explanation for the problem of in-group/out-group disagreement over
the outcome of bargaining. Recall that nonparticipants in bargaining
processes tend to be less satisfied with the outcomes of those negotiations than participants.'4' While nonparticipants may be suspicious of
hidden environmental dangers in the outcome of the process, nonparticipants may also suspect that the participants set the price of efficiency improvements too low by failing to extract the maximum
amount of pollution reduction gains from industry. If that concern
motivates nonparticipants, we would expect them to be more likely to
oppose proposals produced by bargaining, even if those proposals
represent Pareto improvements. In this way, the bargaining process
offers only participants an opportunity to get a true sense of the4 2gains
from trade to be had. Nonparticipants have no such opportunity.
Third, if environmental interests can trade efficiency improvements for environmental improvements beyond those required by law,
environmental interests may prefer inefficient regulations precisely
because those regulations hamstring industry. This is true in cases of
bargaining over efficiency improvements for individual firms or entire
industries. The costlier the status quo is to industry, the greater will

140. Indeed, this may be possible only when the price extracted from industry, in terms of
pollution reduction, is very high. This is one possible explanation of the bargaining process that
produced the acid rain trading program under 1990 Clean Air Act amendments.
141. See supranotes 110-11 and accompanying text.
142. Jacobs reports that trust-building was a key byproduct of the information sharing processes that took place during the early phases of the Environmental Leadership Program. See
Jacobs, supranote 83, at 33-34.
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be industry's willingness to pay (in environmental improvements) to
eliminate those inefficiencies. This offers another reason why, in the
context of bargaining-based regulatory reform, environmental interests' preferences over how to reduce pollution (the x-axis) are conditional on their preferences over how much to reduce pollution (the yaxis). Recall that in Figure 2 the most cost-efficient pollution control
policies lie on the x-axis. If the status quo policy lies a great distance
from the x-axis (say at point u rather than point v in Figure 2), environmental interests should be able to extract larger pollution reduction gains from industry in return for a new policy somewhere on the
x-axis."
Fourth, this analysis suggests two additional reasons why
players on the national environmental policymaking stage, like national environmental groups and EPA headquarters (call them "national environmentalists"'44 ), might be more likely to oppose collaborative reforms than local environmentalists and EPA regional personnel,
even if those reforms produce significant environmental benefits.
First, unlike their local counterparts, national environmentalists are
repeat players in this bargaining game. By driving a hard bargain at
individual sites, they may establish a reputation for firmness in the
iterated game, thereby maximizing their long-run payoffs. Second,
national environmentalists are engaged in another, larger bargaining
process over changes to the status quo, but on a policy-wide basis.
Their lobbying efforts involve a continuous process of trying to move
broad policy-that is, the rule itself, not just its application in a single
instance or set of instances-toward a more preferred position. For
example, if the status quo policy is somewhere on indifference curve
El in Figure 2, national environmentalists are continually seeking
ways to move it to a point on E2 or E3. We can view the long process
that preceded the 1990 acid rain marketable permits program in this
way. Environmental interests consented to allow the acid rain allowance trading program, an incentives-based approach to sulfur dioxide
pollution, to become law only in exchange for an additional 10 million
tons in annual reductions in sulfur dioxide emissions beyond those
required under the existing regulatory regime." 5

143. If the status quo is at point v, the best that environmental interests can expect to do is
to move to indifference curve E2. If the status quo is at point u, there is the potential to move to
indifference curve E3.
144. This term may be a bit of a misnomer in that it refers to environmental interests whose
concern is moving national policy. These people may be located anywhere in the EPA, or
throughout the environmental policy community.
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (1995) (outlining the purpose of the 1990 acid rain program,
namely "to reduce the adverse effects of acid deposition through reductions in annual emissions
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Thus, the incentives facing national environmentalists are different. They are playing a dynamic, or longer-term, game not well
represented by the static Edgeworth Box. Because they seek positivesum changes at the broad policy level, national environmentalists also
benefit if the status quo policy lies a greater rather than lesser distance from the x-axis-that is, if it is more inefficient rather than less.
The more inefficient the policy, the more industry will be willing to
pay (either by reducing their own pollution or acceding to changes in
policy that mandate those same reductions) to change the policy in
order to realize efficiency gains.146 Furthermore, to the extent that
individual firms or sets of firms can realize efficiency improvements
through reform initiatives, national environmentalists lose their leverage over those firms, thereby decreasing the likelihood of arranging
a future positive-sum change at the broad policy level.' 7 Thus, national environmentalists have reasons to resist collaborative reforms
apart from any concerns over industry motives or the ability of local
environmental groups to participate effectively in the process.
IV. THE TRAJECTORY OF PROJECT XL
A closer look at the short history of the Project XL program illustrates how these strategic considerations have undermined the
pursuit of Pareto improvements. Since its inception, the program has
been plagued by arguments over the appropriate price (in terms of
environmental improvements) that the EPA should charge for granting efficiency improvements to industry. These conflicts have been
evident in the evolution of the substantive criteria that govern the
selection and approval of XL project proposals, and the application of
those criteria in practice. Formal project criteria have evolved over
time to place increasing emphasis on the importance of environmental
benefits and stakeholder consensus, reducing the relative importance
of other Pareto improvements in the process. This new bargaining

of sulfur dioxide of ten million tons from 1980 emission levels," a more than 50 percent reduction).
146. We might also speculate that national groups will place a lower value on local, sitespecific environmental improvements than local groups do.
147. The corollary to this is that when bargaining produces exchanges of efficiency improvements for environmental improvements, it removes from the table the object of national environmentalists' future attention. That is, programs like Project XL lead to emissions reductions
or other environmental improvements that national environmentalists may have hoped to
address legislatively in the future. Thanks to Don Eliot for helping us to clarify this point.
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environment has, in turn, provided additional leverage for national
environmentalists to veto or delay the pursuit of positive-sum bargains.
A. The Evolution of Project Criteriaand the Priceof Efficiency
Recall that in the Project XL framework, bargaining occurs on
a proposal-by-proposal basis. "8 The EPA designed the Project XL program to provide an institutional framework that would help
stakeholders realize positive-sum improvements through individual
bargaining processes. " Consistent with this view of the program, the
original criteria by which the EPA evaluated proposals" can be
grouped into three categories: (1) those that represent improvements
for project sponsors, mostly industry; (2) those that represent improvements for environmental and interest groups other than project
sponsors; and (3) procedural rules that govern the bargaining process.
As originally designed, the program envisioned a process under which
applicants would offer category 2 improvements to other stakeholders
in exchange for category 1 improvements, all in the context of a process governed by category 3 rules.5 1
Category 1 improvements include the "cost savings," "technical
and administrative feasibility," and "new and innovative approaches"
criteria.'52 That project sponsors benefit from reduced compliance costs
is obvious, as is the requirement that projects meet certain feasibility
thresholds. The "new and innovative approaches" criterion goes hand-

148. See supra Section B.1.
149. This much is widely accepted. See Caldart & Ashford, supra note 40, at 10-11 (noting
that collaborative processes can facilitate better understanding of issues and provide opportunities for creative problem-solving); Freeman, supra note 36, at 7 (arguing that "multistakeholder
collaboration" facilitates innovation that increases the "quality" of regulation); Mank, supra note
40, at 4 ("Project XL has the potential to reduce both regulatory costs and pollution by allowing
companies to try innovative pollution control strategies that are customized for individual
facilities rather than relying on the current one size fits all approach.... .'). More importantly,
the EPA's initial solicitation of XL proposals reflects this view. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL)
Pilot Projects [hereinafter "Initial Solicitation"], 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23, 1995) ("National
environmental requirements may not always be the best solution to environmental problems.
Substantial cost savings can sometimes be realized, and environmental quality enhanced,
through more flexible approaches involving pollution prevention.').
150. See Initial Solicitation, 60 Fed. Reg. at 27,282.
151. The EPA's initial solicitation of XL proposals envisioned a process under which projects
that survived the initial EPA screening would move forward into the bargaining process. That
process would involve interested stakeholders and would produce, if successful, a "Final Project
Agreement," or TPA," specifying the terms of the bargain. See id. at 27,284-85.
152. See id. at 27,287. We should note that some industries may have had less tangible and
self-interested reasons for participating in the Project XL program, such as the desire to promote
innovation and change for its own sake. See Marcus et al., supra note 56.
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in-hand with the "cost savings" criterion in that, in XL parlance, the
most commonly touted innovation is some version of increased flexibility, such as cross-media permitting, or multi-pollutant permit limits.1" Category 2 improvements include the "superior environmental
performance" and "ensuring compliance with environmental justice
policies" criteria." The former criterion ensures that environmental
interests will realize gains along with project sponsors. The latter
criterion ensures that the process will not hurt interests who are
typically not represented at the XL bargaining table. Category 3 rules
include the "support of stakeholders" and "information availability"
criteria.5 ' These criteria are designed to ensure that the product of the
bargaining process is a verifiable Pareto improvement over the status
quo. The former criterion protects the interests of participants in the
bargaining process by ensuring that all must agree on proposed
changes in the status quo. The latter protects the interests of nonparticipants by facilitating their monitoring and evaluation of the
process and its outcome.
As we have noted, it was not clear at the outset of the program
how the EPA would balance these criteria in reaching decisions on
proposed projects, or exactly how it would define each of the criteria in
M The ill-fated 3M proposal highlighted the difficulty of
application."
these tasks for the EPA. The 3M proposal was premised on the notion
that significant reductions in permitted emissions of pollutants would
constitute superior environmental performance. 3M proposed to cap
plant-wide emissions of VOC's'5 and hazardous air pollutants at levels
significantly lower than those currently required under the Clean Air
' The benefit to 3M was that the implementation of the permit as
Act. 58
proposed would cut its personnel and monitoring costs. The proposal
was supported by a stakeholders' advisory council consisting of state
and local officials, local environmental advocacy groups, university
M

153. The EPA's description of this criterion is as follows: 'EPA is looking for projects that test
innovative strategies for achieving environmental results. These strategies may include processes, technologies, or management practices." See Initial Solicitation, 60 Fed. Reg. at 27,287.
In practice, most of the innovations have involved ways to regulate pollution, though some
innovations have involved technical processes. An example of the latter is the recently approved
Andersen Corporation proposal. See EPA Web Site (visited Jan. 7, 2000) <http:ll yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf'all/anderson.html>.
154. See Initial Solicitation, 60 Fed. Reg. at 27,287.
155. See id.
156. See supra Section II.B.1.
157. See supranote 59.
158. See Buelow, supranote 56, at 15-17.
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representatives, and other members of the public."' However, the EPA
withheld approval of the plan as approved by the stakeholders, apparently based on its belief that, while permitted emissions would decrease under the 3M proposal, actual emissions might not. For participating stakeholders, including local regulators and environmental
interests," the permit reductions satisfied the "superior environmental performance" criterion; for environmental interests outside the
bargaining process, including national environmental groups'" and
some at EPA headquarters," only actual reductions would suffice.
Eventually, 3M and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency withdrew
their proposal" in a letter accusing the EPA of "clinging to its command and control habits."'"
A second promising early proposal met a similar fate. Anheuser-Busch, another company with an environmentally progressive
reputation, developed a Project XL proposal that would have made the
company's Jacksonville, Florida brewery operations a model for multimedia permitting." However, after negotiations bogged down over a

159. Stakeholder support for the 3M-Hutchinson proposal is memorialized in the June 12,
1995, letter from the stakeholder committee to Charles Williams, Commissioner, Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency. See <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/all/3MStakeholders-toWilliams-6-12-96.html>.
160. The disagreement over whether the imposition of more stringent legal limits on 3M
satisfied the "superior environmental performance" criterion is evident in the July 24, 1996,
letter from 3M to the EPA: 'With our experiment at Hutchinson, we hope to help government
develop common sense ways of achieving superior environmental performance which is simply
performance (measured in a number of different ways) which is better than required under
existing regulation." See What Is "SuperiorEnvironmental Performance"?3M's Perspective (July
24, 1996) <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xl_home.nsf/all3m-sep-position.html>.
161. The Natural Resources Defense Council, a national environmental group that did not
participate in the bargaining process, objected to the 3M proposal:
Contrary to both the spirit and explicit criteria of Project XL, the 3M proposed agreement
offers "reductions" only on paper. The stated intention of the project is to provide
...
broad pre-approval of facility expansions and modifications in exchange for less permissive emissions limits in the facility's permits. However, the proposed limits remain so
permissive as to allow the facility to increase its emissions to very high levels.
See NRDC's Comments on 3M Proposal (July 3, 1996) <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.
nsf/all/nrdc-comments-7-3-96.htmi>.
162. See Buelow, supranote 56, at 22-24.
163. See General Policy: 3M Decides to Drop Out of Project XL ProcessAfter Disagreement
Over PerformanceGuarantees,27 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 1045, 1046 (Sept. 13, 1996).
164. 3M's letter also said that 'EPA's proposal fails to entrust 3M, a company with a proven
record of exemplary environmental performance, to take on the responsibility and accountability
for proving that Project XL flexibility will result in superior environmental performance," and
that 3M "never envisioned requiring prescriptive permit conditions that render the experimental
nature of XL moot." See Inflexibility?: EPA Clings to Command and Control; 3M Shelves Project
XL Proposal,Environmental Remediation Technology (Information Access Company Newsletter
Database) at No.19, Vol.4 (Sept. 18, 1996).
165. See Anheuser-Busch Proposal (visited Jan. 13, 2000) <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/
x_home.nsf/al/a-b.html>.
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similar dispute over the meaning of the superior environmental performance criterion, Anheuser-Busch withdrew its proposal."
As it became evident that project sponsors (and some, particularly local, stakeholders) were applying the Project XL evaluation
criteria differently than the EPA, the Agency moved to bolster the
bargaining position of environmental interests in the process. The
1997 revision of the Project XL evaluation criteria places added emphasis on the "environmental results" and "stakeholder support ' criteria." The Agency clarified the meaning of superior environmental
performance by specifying a two-tiered test" that project proposals
must meet. Tier 1 addresses the 3M proposal dispute by requiring that
superior environmental performance be judged against the "benchmark" of current facility performance or future allowable performance,
whichever is more stringent.1" Tier 2 specifies that the EPA will look
at the proposed quantitative increments of improvement over the Tier
1 benchmark in determining whether performance will be superior
enough. 10
Whether intentionally or not, the 1997 changes to the XL program appear to strengthen the hand of national environmentalists in
the XL bargaining process. The new rules give additional leverage to
environmental groups seeking to increase the cost of securing efficiency improvements by ensuring that the price would be higher than
that offered by 3M (that is, more than mere permit limit reductions),

166. A representative of Anheuser-Busch, Chris Spire, presented his views of the problems
associated with Project XL at an environmental management conference. He listed several
problems associated with the XL process: the higher priority given to the EPA's goal of superior
environmental benefit relative to the parallel goal of efficiency and flexibility for the good of the
business; refusal by the EPA to credit prior "beyond compliance" efforts; the EPA's evercognizant need to sell the initiative to environmental activists; and the lack of trust and credibility between the EPA, environmentalists, and industry. See Kevin A. Fletcher, EPA's Project
XL Voluntary Initiative: The Struggle for EnhancedEnvironmentalProtectionat a Lower Cost, 3
ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 51, 56-57 (1997).
167. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects [hereinafter XL Modifications] 62 Fed. Reg.
19,872 (Apr. 23, 1997).
168. The EPA described the test as follows:
EPA is establishing a two tiered assessment of superior environmental performance for
Project XL Proposals. Tier 1 is a quantitative benchmark of the project against the environmental performance that would have occurred absent the program. It establishes a
baseline of equivalence from which superior environmental performance can be measured. A project that is not at least equivalent, based on the factors discussed in Tier 1,
can not be considered superior overall. Tier 2 is an examination of factors, both quantitative and qualitative, that lead EPA to judge that a project will produce a superior level of
environmental performance that merits testing the innovation being proposed.
Id. at 19,874.
169. The EPA defined this Tier 1 benchmark as "either the current actual environmental
loadings or the future allowable environmental loadings, whichever is more protective." Id.
170. See id. at 19,875.
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and by ensuring that in each case the price would be high enough to
satisfy all the participating stakeholders. Likewise, the Agency gives
additional leverage to nonparticipating national environmental groups
by stating explicitly that such groups fall within the Project XL definition of "stakeholders." 7 By implication, then, the 1997 changes to
the program decrease the leverage of local and regional stakeholders
in the bargaining process.
B. Balancingthe Criteriain Practice
Have national environmentalists used this leverage to their
advantage? Since these changes in the project criteria took effect, the
Agency has approved some other high-profile projects, most notably
proposals by Intel, Merck, and Weyerhauser, that satisfied the
Agency's definition of superior environmental performance while
offering project sponsors enough efficiency improvements to make the
projects worthwhile. 2 As of this writing, 15 XL projects have moved
from proposals to the implementation stage, while more than thirty
have been rejected or withdrawn.'73
1. The Bargained-for Exchanges
As we have noted, many of the Project XL battles are fought
over the price to be charged (in environmental improvements) for
efficiency improvements. That is, agency and private sector
stakeholders negotiate with the project sponsor in an attempt to reach
agreement on a set of positive-sum changes to the status quo. If the
EPA is satisfied with the outcome of the bargaining process, the project moves from a proposal to the implementation stage. What kinds of
proposed environmental improvements have been deemed sufficient in
practice? Do successful project proposals offer greater, or more tangi-

171. Specifically, the 1997 notice stated that, while stakeholders were originally defined as
including "communities near the project, local or state governments, businesses, environmental
and other public interest groups, or other similar entities... [that] definition includes both those
stakeholders in the proximity of the project and those stakeholders interested in the broader
implementation of the concepts being tested in the project, such as state, regional or national
environmental groups." Id. at 19,877.
172. See Project XL, Weyerhauserproposes multi-media approachto environmentalprotection
(visited Dec. 29, 1999) <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/all/weyer.html>; Project XL, Intel
Drafts Environmental Operations Plan and Obtains Flexible Air Permit (visited Dec. 29, 1999);
<http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xl-home.nsf/alllintel.html>; Project XL, (visited Dec. 29, 1999)
<http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/all/merck.html>.
173. See XL Projects (visited Dec. 29, 1999) <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/alll

xl info>.
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ble, environmental benefits generally? How have local and national
stakeholders influenced the process?
As of this writing, of the 36 industry-sponsored proposals that
the EPA has disposed of, 12 have moved beyond the application stage,
while 24 have been rejected or withdrawn.' All of the proposed projects have included some form of efficiency improvements for the company, such as reduced compliance costs, reporting flexibility, flexibility
in the means of compliance, or waivers of particular emission or other
regulatory requirements. These latter two categories of company
benefits included things like multi-pollutant or multi-source permit
caps on air emissions, 75 de-listing78 of listed hazardous wastes, and
permission to make process changes without triggering new permitting requirements under the Clean Air Act.' In return, most companies proposed some combination of reduced permit limits (what 3M
offered), reduced emissions of pollution, enhanced environmental
management of the facility, and/or other environmental benefits.
Table 1 shows the distribution of kinds of environmental benefits
companies have proposed to date.
Based on the data in Table 1, the EPA's actions appear to be
consistent with their (revised) rhetoric. Not surprisingly, proposals
that have offered more tangible and guaranteed environmental bene-

174. Data were coded using information from the EPA Project XL Web Site and supplemental research. We elected to focus only on projects that involved bargaining between the regulator
and the regulated. Consequently, we chose to exclude from our data set projects proposed by
public entities in their capacity as regulators. Thus, for example, proposals by state environmental agencies to change the state regulatory regimes that they administer were excluded,
while proposals by public sector owners of regulated facilities seeking compliance flexibility were
included. Though it is a bit of a misnomer, we refer to our sample as "industry-sponsored"
proposals for that reason. Our final sample included 12 successful projects and 24 unsuccessful
ones, all proposals by regulated entities offering some sort of environmental improvement in
return for efficiency improvements.
175. Under a multi-pollutant cap, pollutant-specific permit limits would be replaced by a
multi-pollutant volume or other limitation. Under a multi-source cap, individually regulated
emission points would be regulated as one emission point (or bubble), which is what the Intel
project involves. See Project XL, Intel Drafts Environmental Operations Plan and Obtains
Flexible Air Permit(visited Dec. 29, 1999) <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xlxlhome.nsf/al]Iintel.html>.
Either approach would allow increases in emissions of one pollutant without prior agency
approval so long as the overall limitation or cap is not exceeded.
176. Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA!), the EPA lists certain
specific wastes or waste streams (sometimes company or facility-specific wastes) as "hazardous
wastes," triggering a variety of regulatory requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1994). "De-listing"
refers to the process by which companies seek to have their wastes removed from the list by
demonstrating that the wastes ought not to be considered hazardous under the statute.
177. Specifically, sponsors seek to avoid the need for an air permit modification that may be
triggered by changes in production or other changes in the facility. See, e.g., Project XL (visited
Dec. 29, 1999) http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/alYmerck.html (explaining Merck's successful XL project).
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fits, in the form of reduced pollution emissions,"8 have tended to succeed more often than projects that did not. Note, however, the presence of some projects that promised reduced pollution but nevertheless
were not selected. These included projects promising reduced hazardous waste generation in return for relief from hazardous waste regulatory requirements, relief that the EPA was apparently not prepared to
give. "' Of the projects that did not promise quantifiable and guaranteed reductions in pollution or waste generation, only 10 percent (2
projects) were successful. Predictably, the mere promise of the reduced
risk, through tightened permit limits or enhanced environmental
management at the project site, was not as highly correlated with
success in the XL program. In particular, while 14 proposals promised
enhanced environmental management at sponsor facilities, only four
of those were successful. While the combination of efficiency improvements for project sponsors and reduced risk represents a clear Pareto
improvement over the status quo at the site, the EPA deemed the
latter an insufficient price to pay for the former. Rather, satisfaction of
the "superior environmental performance" criterion through guaranteed pollution reduction seems to be a surer path to success in Project
XL.

178. These data include a few projects, including some successful projects, for which a socalled "multimedia cap" on emissions was proposed. In such cases, the overall effect of the
proposed change is to reduce emissions, though the emissions of any single pollutant could
increase over time. We coded such cases as promising emissions reductions.
179. In 1996, the EPA rejected proposals from DuPont and Eastman Chemical for de-listing
of specific RCRA listed hazardous wastes or waste streams, saying that the de-listing should be
pursued outside of the XL process. See Project XL, DuPont Proposes Flexibility for Hazardous
Waste Listing at Its Victoria, Texas Facility (visited Dec. 29, 1999) <http:/yosemite.epa.gov/
xl/xl -home.nsf/al]/dupont.html>; Project XL, (visited Dec. 29, 1999) <http://yosemite.epa.gov/
xl/xl home.nsf/all/eastman.html>. Subsequently, however, the Agency approved another delisting proposal by HADCO. Interestingly, the EPA approved the HADCO de-listing proposal
after the 1997 revisions to the XL program. See Project XL, HADCO Proposes To De-List Its
Wastewater Sludges From RCRA (visited Dec. 29, 1999), <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.
nsf/all/HADCD.html>.
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TABLE 1: Types of Environmental Benefits
Proposed in Project XLa

Successful
Projectsd
UnsuccessUucces

ful ProjectsI

Did Project
Guarantee
Reduce Actual
Emissions?
NO
YES
2
10
4

20

Did Project
Propose Reductions in Permit
Limits?
NO
YES
2
10
4

18

Did the Project
Propose an
Environmental
Mgt. System?
NO
YES
8
4
14

9

a. Note that projects often propose more than one kind of environmental benefit, and that some
propose other kinds of environmental benefits not listed here.
b. Projects proposing guaranteed net reductions in pollution were placed in the "yes" category.
Projects not proposing guaranteed net reductions, like the 3M proposal and other projects
promising "potential" reductions, were placed in the "no" category.
c. For one of the unsuccessful projects, we could not determine from the project dockets whether
or not an environmental management system was proposed.
d. We coded all projects that survived to the implementation stage as "successful" projects; those
that did not were coded as "unsuccessful."

For most of the unsuccessful projects, we were able to identify
reasons for their failure from the information in the project dockets.
Of the 24 unsuccessful projects, 18 were unsuccessful because of their
failure to satisfy the "superior environmental performance" criterion,
while four were rejected or withdrawn for other reasons, and two
others failed for reasons we could not determine." In other words, in
75 percent of the unsuccessful cases, the EPA was unwilling to grant
the company its proposed efficiency improvements because the environmental benefits offered were insufficient.18 ' This remains the most
common reason for failure of XL project proposals, even after the
EPA's 1997 revision of its decision criteria emphasizing the importance of quantifiable environmental improvements." All of this im-

180. We could not determine from the EPA docket any specific reason for the failure of the
Coeur Alaska and PCS Nitro projects.
181. Only four of the unsuccessful projects proposed guaranteed reduced emissions. Of those
four, three projects were rejected for failure to satisfy the SEP criterion. However, the three
comprised a package of proposals by Dow Chemical that the EPA rejected in May, 1996.
182. Not surprisingly, however, the success rate of proposals has gone up since the 1997 revisions to the program. Presumably, prospective sponsors are learning what sort of proposals are
likely to succeed, particularly given the guidance contained in the 1997 revisions. Thus, we
might infer that this censoring of prospective XL proposals from the data set by sponsors means
that the data tend to understate the impacts of the 1997 revisions over time. That is, projects
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plies that the EPA has been fairly successful in its attempts to increase the price of obtaining efficiency improvements using the XL
bargaining process.
2. Stakeholder Support
Of course, the EPA's 1997 revision of its Project XL decision
criteria indicates that the success or failure of a Project XL proposal is
determined not only by the characteristics of the project involved, but
also by the support (or lack thereof) by interested stakeholders. Has
that been the case in practice? Do stakeholders have de facto veto
rights? Can they veto proposed projects that offer substantial environmental improvements, like significant emissions reductions beyond
those required by law? Or will the EPA overrule stakeholders in such
instances? Conversely, will the EPA veto projects that enjoy unanimous local stakeholder support?
Unfortunately, the data on stakeholder support are sketchy,
particularly with respect to unsuccessful projects. This is due partly to
the fact that the EPA rejected a significant percentage of unsuccessful
proposals prior to any opportunity for stakeholders to express opinions
one way or the other." Hence, Table 2 summarizes data on
stakeholder support or opposition for only a subset of the total number
of XL projects. Among projects on which stakeholders did express
opinions, unanimous local stakeholder support does not always correlate with success. While it is the exception rather than the rule, the
EPA on a few occasions has approved projects that were opposed by a
minority of local stakeholders, contrary to the Agency's stated preference for consensus. Three such projects-the Weyerhauser, HADCO,
and Merck projects-proposed guaranteed pollution reductions, and in
each case the opposing stakeholders represented a clear minority
view. Likewise, the EPA has rejected some projects that enjoyed
unanimous local stakeholder support, the 3M project being a case in
point. None of those projects proposed guaranteed pollution emissions
reductions. Therefore, it appears that the EPA places more emphasis
on its "superior environmental performance" criterion than on

that would have been rejected for failure to propose sufficient environmental benefits are less
likely to find their way into the proposal pool now than they were before the 1997 revisions.
183. These proposals included projects deemed inappropriate for the XL program for one reason or another. See Project XL, U.S. Coast Guard Grant Proposal (visited Dec. 29, 1999)
<http://yosemite.epa.gov/xlhxhome.nsf/alluscg.html>; Project XL, Uniroyal Chemical Co.
Proposed Pollution Prevention Projects That Will Reduce the Generation Of Hazardous Wastes
and Pollutants(visited Dec. 29, 1999) <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xlxlhome.nsf/all/uniroyal.html>.
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stakeholder consensus. Unfortunately, in those cases where the EPA
overruled a local stakeholder consensus, the data do not permit us to
distinguish proposals rejected by EPA headquarters from proposals
rejected by EPA regions. We have only anecdotal evidence to support
the notion that support for XL proposals is stronger in the regional
offices.'
Table 2: Stakeholder and National Environmental
Group Support and Success in Project XL
Unanimous local
stakeholder support

Opposition from
national environmental group
YES
NO

YES

NO

Successful
projects
(12 Cases)

5

3

3

Unsuccessful
projects
(24 Cases)

4

1

5

3

What about the EPA's professed intention (in its 1997 modification of program decision criteria) to give additional weight to the
opinions of non-participant environmental interests? While the opposition of non-local environmental groups is not necessarily fatal to XL
proposals,18' it has correlated mildly with failure. Of the eight instances in which national environmental groups objected formally to
XL proposals, five resulted in rejection or withdrawal of the project. Of
those five, three involved situations in which local stakeholder support
for the project was unanimous, yet the project failed. The Natural
Resources Defense Council ("NRDC"), in particular, has expressed
opposition to several XL projects, including the 3M proposal, and has

184. See Susskind & Secunda, supra note 29, at 95-97 (quoting one EPA staffer who commented that "those who participated in Project XL [within the Agency] were considered turncoats by certain important middle level managers').

185. For example, it appears from the Merck project docket that the NRDC strongly opposed
the multi-pollutant cap and other aspects of the Merck proposal. Yet the project ultimately
succeeded. See <http:llyosemite.epa.gov/xl/xl_home.nsf/alllmerck.html>.
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intervened in some others in an attempt to persuade the EPA to demand a higher price for the efficiency improvements that the project
sponsor sought." On the other hand, the EPA approved some XL
proposals over the objection of national environmental groups, though
two of the three instances of this occurred prior to the EPA's 1997
revision of its Project XL criteria.187
What does come through clearly in the data is that national
environmental organizations distrust the process in ways that local
organizations do not. A review of the EPA's XL proposal dockets reveals only a single expression of qualified support for a proposal by a
national environmental group,"' and at least eight interventions in
opposition to a proposal.189 Yet the records reveal numerous expressions of support for XL proposals by local stakeholders, including local
citizens groups.1 " This is consistent with our expectations, and with
prior anecdotal evidence. 9 ' This could be a manifestation of the ingroup/out-group problem, consistent with the idea that participation
in the bargaining process builds trust in the outcome. However, it is
also consistent with the expectation that local stakeholders place more
value on the local environmental benefits that the company offers.
National environmental leaders care about a different bargaining

186. See, e.g., Letter from David Lennett, Representing NRDC and the Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF) to EPA Representatives In Connection With the Ultimately Successful Molex
Project Proposal, Dec. 3, 1997, at Project XL, (visited Dec. 1999) <http://yosemite.epa.
gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/all~lennett-ltr-12-3-97.html> (urging the EPA to impose additional conditions
on the project sponsor before approving the project).
187. NRDC objected to both the Intel and HADCO projects in 1997 and 1996 respectively,
both of which were approved by the EPA before the 1997 revision of program criteria. See
<http://yosemite.epa.gov/xlhxlhome.nsf/all/intel.html>; <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/
all/hadco.html>. The EPA also approved the Molex proposal in 1998, after receiving correspondence from NRDC and EDF expressing mild or qualified objections to the project. See
<http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xl-home.nsf/al/molex.html>.
188. In a letter to the Regional EPA Deputy Director, a representative from the Environmental Defense Fund expressed concern that the XL plan for the Atlanta Atlantic Steel Project
"would not provide for the implementation of all reasonably available control measures to assure
the timely attainment of air quality in the region." See <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.
nsf/allledfcomm.html>. The representative nevertheless expressed support for the XL process
stating "[w]e would very much like to see the Atlantic Steel project XL process succeed as a
national model for how Clean Air Act conformity and Brownfield problems can be turned into
opportunities for urban revitalization, livable communities, improved access of low income
communities to jobs, and economic growth with environmental progress." See id. For a description of the successfully implemented Atlanta Atlantic Steel Project, see <http://yosemite.epa.gov/
xl/xl home.nsf/all/atlantic.html>.
189. See <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/all/xlinfo>.
190. See id.
191. See Susskind & Secunda, supranote 29, at 107 (describing an environmental organization representative's concern over their inability to monitor the process "at least until the first
federal register notice!).
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game-bargaining over national policy-and will grant efficiency
improvements for industry only when paid in that other currency. We
cannot say which phenomenon drives these results. Nor can we confirm whether this same sort of fault line exists between regulators
from EPA regional offices and EPA headquarters, as was apparently
the case in the context of the 3M project. We note simply that either or
both may be at work here.
In sum, the trajectory of the Project XL program to date reflects some common pitfalls in the bargaining process, pitfalls that
lead to outcomes that sometimes do not comport with bargaining
theory. Politics, it is said, is a zero-sum game. The theoretical expectations of the bargaining game do not accommodate well the larger
political context in which bargaining over environmental outcomes
occurs. That is why Project XL bargaining, like bargaining in the
experimental lab, has yielded only a subset (and probably a small
subset) of the available Pareto improvements.
V. CONCLUSION
So where does this leave collaborative regulation? This Section
addresses that question briefly. We note first, however, that our primary purpose in this Article has been diagnostic, to offer an alternative explanation for the failure of collaborative regulation to meet its
proponents' expectations. The strategic bargaining dynamic outlined
here offers some insight into industry's (and others') impatience with,
and environmental interests' wariness toward, collaborative regulation. A variety of participants, including national environmental interests within the EPA, retain the power to veto project proposals,
making agreement difficult to achieve. Believing that environmental
interests have, or ought to have, preferences over policy outcomes like
those shown in Figure 2, proponents of collaborative regulation wonder why environmental interests veto proposals that would combine
efficiency improvements with improvements in environmental conditions, even when the latter are more modest than the former. The
testimony of a state environmental agency director before a House
subcommittee illustrates this view:
EPA's Project XL has ... potential for success, but EPA's approach has severely limited
its effectiveness. EPA's April 1997 guidance defining "superior environmental performance" has become a barrier to approvals of projects .... If innovations have the poten-
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effitial to demonstrate achievement of existing environmental requirements in a more
192
cient and effective manner, then by all means those projects should be pursued.

Stated differently, proponents of Project XL approach the bargaining process by accepting the ends of the status quo policy (its
prescription for how much pollution will be reduced) and challenging
its means (its prescription for how to achieve that pollution reduction
goal). For their part, environmental interests take a polar opposite
view: they are more inclined to challenge the ends of the status quo
policy and to accept the means. Moreover, environmental interests'
view of the status quo is colored not merely by their preference for
more pollution reduction than the status quo policy requires, but also
by their belief that industrial interests were over-represented in the
process by which that policy was created in the first place. Those
predispositions, coupled with the opportunity to achieve highly valued
pollution reduction gains, offer a powerful incentive for strategic behavior in negotiations with industry. This dynamic pervades American
environmental regulation. The politics of the environmental policy
process have created centrifugal forces that have made the search for
common ground difficult. In this larger context, the inability of industry and environmental interests to realize positive-sum gains through
bargaining seems less surprising.
In a sense, then, the picture we have painted here is a bleak
one-bleak in that it points to reasons why we might expect to find
deeply embedded resistance to regulatory change, even positive-sum
change. The picture is bleak only in the relatively short term, however. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that the long-term
prospects for increased use of collaborative regulation are strong,
reasons that become evident when we consider the arguments for and
against it. Commentators seem to be split over the two-pronged question of whether collaborative regulation can or should succeed, between those who favor collaborative regulatory reform but fear that it
is unworkable under the current legal regime and those who oppose
collaborative regulatory reform. As we have noted, many in the latter

192. See Testimony of Russell J. Harding, supra note 77. Karen A. Studders, Commissioner
of the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, echoed these same concerns in her comments on a
draft of federal legislation aimed at facilitating programs like Project XL. See Letter from Karen
A. Studders to Judy Borgers, Legislative Director for Rep. James Greenwood (June 11, 1998) at
<http://www.pca.state.mn.us/programs/projectxl/mpca-com.pdf> ("A key part of why EPA reinvention initiatives have had disappointing results is EPA itself. Instead of allowing innovation
experiments to happen.... EPA chose to focus on requiring guarantees of up-front success. This
has resulted in resource intensive up-front review and micro-management of the proposed
pilots."). For a discussion of the proposed legislation that is the subject of these comments, see
infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
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group disapprove of the use of stakeholder bargaining as a policymaking technique on principle, arguing that it is an abdication of
authority by agencies and therefore contrary to the fundamental underpinnings of our system of administrative law.'93 We have two additional responses to this argument.
First, the argument says nothing about the substantive critique of traditional regulation; rather, it is an attack on the process of
making policy, not its content. If there are positive-sum gains to be
had, the presence of flaws in the process of realizing those gains does
not imply that we should forgo those gains entirely. In the AmocoYorktown project, the EPA waived legal requirements so that Amoco
could control more pollution at less cost.' Few would argue that
granting that waiver was a bad idea, even though the result departed
from existing regulations. The obvious merits of these regulatory
bargains not only compel serious consideration of regulatory bargaining as a process, but also offer hope that the slow and incremental
realization of these gains already underway will demonstrate the
value of the process to an ever-wider circle of people. As these bargaining processes navigate currents of resistance and lurch unevenly
forward, resistance should diminish from those whose primary fear is
that collaborative regulation is a tool for subverting hard-won environmental gains.

193. For the discussion of this view, see supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text. While
we have not yet seen the argument made in print, the recent resurrection of the delegation
doctrine in the federal courts offers support for the critics of informal, ad hoc processes like
Project XL. The argument is as follows. There are signs that the federal courts are growing
increasingly willing to strike down broad or unconstrained legislative delegations of authority to
agencies if those agencies fail to impose restrictions on the exercise of their own discretion by
promulgating standards that they will follow in making decisions. See American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (overturning EPA air quality standards on
nondelegation doctrine grounds). For a commentary on this case, see Cass R. Sunstein, Is the
Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?,98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 309-10 (2000). As of this writing, the
EPA is seeking rehearing of the American Trucking decision in the D.C. Circuit. However, Lisa
Bressman argues that the decision follows the Supreme Court's prior signals in AT&T v. Iowa
Utilities Board, 119 S.Ct. 721 (1999), which reached a similar conclusion with respect to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schecter Poultry at the Millenium:
A DelegationDoctrine for the Administrative State,__ YALE L.J. _ (forthcoming 2000). One could
argue that these decisions signal a de facto constitutional requirement that published rules
guide agency decisions, and that privately negotiated waivers from rules (even when sanctioned
by agencies) like Project XL run counter to that principle. While a full consideration of that
argument is beyond the scope of this Article, the argument seems to stretch those decisions too
far, particularly in light of other decisions recognizing (1) the right of agencies to make policy on
a case-by-case basis, and (2) the right to waive regulatory requirements. See SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); supranote 37 and accompanying text (discussing waivers).
194. See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
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Second, and more importantly, the bargaining-as-abdication
argument attacks a straw man model of the administrative process.
One need not subscribe to a pure interest group bargaining model of
the policy process in order to favor collaborative regulation of the kind
discussed here. Conversely, these experiments in collaboration involve
no cession of authority by agencies to private actors. In each case, the
EPA retains ultimate policymaking authority and has not been hesitant to use that authority irrespective of the wishes of industry and
environmental stakeholders alike.'95 Our data analysis implies that
fears that collaborative regulation leaves the fox in charge of the henhouse are unfounded. The EPA has vetoed Project XL proposals even
when those proposals were endorsed by stakeholder bargaining
groups; the EPA has done the same in the context of negotiated rulemakings. In fact, contrary to the claims of critics of reform, there is no
inherent inconsistency between collaborative regulatory reform and
the various public interest models of the administrative process.
To the contrary, there is a strong argument that collaborative
regulation improves agencies' pursuit of the public interest, and not
simply by identifying positive-sum policy changes. Collaborative bargaining can be seen as one embodiment of a more deliberative and less
adversarial policy process, one that comports with the constitutional
model of deliberative democracy. Indeed, some scholars have argued
that elected officials can no longer deliberate in the way the founders
intended, and that agencies do a better job of deliberating over policy
change in the modern world.'" It does not stretch this notion to argue
that collaborative regulatory reforms embrace deliberation better than
their more adversarial and legalistic alternatives. This is what some
defenders of collaborative processes have argued. Jody Freeman, for
example, rejects interest group bargaining models of policymaking,
but is an advocate of flexible policies produced by "collaborative governance," including negotiated rulemaking and processes like Project
XL. 1 Jim Rossi offers an even more self-conscious version of this
argument, and sees "consensus solutions" as more consistent with
deliberative democracy than traditional alternatives. '" For these

195. William Funk argues that the EPA has ceded policymaking initiative, if not policymaking authority, to private groups. See Funk, supra note 70, at 1382. If so, it is hard to see how
this represents a change from traditional policymaking processes, whether legislative or agencybased. Interest groups are a common source of policy initiatives, and always have been.
196. See generally, e.g., ROHR, supra note 15 (making this general argument outside of the
context of regulatory reform).
197. Freeman, supranote 36, at 82-90.
198. Rossi, supra note 108, at 239 ("[Cqonsensus solutions are more legitimate than mere
preference aggregations. . . .'). In fact, Rossi's view is the polar opposite of William Funk's.
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reasons, the normative argument against collaborative regulation as
an abdication of authority seems weak.
Despite its merits, however, collaborative regulation faces some
remaining obstacles. While collaborative regulation may sell itself to
some of its current opponents over time, the incentive to bargain
strategically remains. As this Article has shown, that incentive, combined with the statutory obstacles to widespread use of collaborative
regulation, imposes formidable transaction costs on bargaining. As
transaction costs go up, the number of positive-sum changes worth
pursuing goes down. The problem is exacerbated by the EPA's efforts
to structure the bargaining process in ways that increase those costs.
Indeed, other studies of the XL program have pointed toward EPA
resistance as a key component of transaction costs."'
Of course, there is no shortage of proposed solutions to this
problem, and some proponents of collaboration are sanguine about the
possibility of legislative or other changes that would ease restrictions
on the EPA's ability to pursue positive-sum change. Edward Weber,
for example, sounds a call for developing a system for pluralistic bargaining under rules that build trust and facilitate information sharing
and consensus building."® Similarly, Freeman advocates legislation
authorizing the EPA to waive legal requirements that would otherwise
preclude positive-sum policy changes." Others have issued similar
calls for lifting statutory constraints to policy proposals produced by
consensus bargaining."2° Policy proposals produced by collaborative

Whereas Funk sees agencies as making policy through a process of "instrumental rationality",
see supra note 105, Rossi sees the administrative process as neither "solely instrumental [n]or
strategic..." See Rossi, supra note 108, at 205-06. Like Funk, Rossi sees government as responsible for "defining virtue," but argues that this can best be achieved through consensus processes.
For a good discussion of the deliberative democracy model, see generally Seidenfeld, supra note
36.
199. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHALLENGES

FACING EPA'S EFFORTS TO REINVENT ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, GAO/RCED-97-155, at 6
(July 2, 1997) (concluding that XL has been hampered by a failure to secure "buy-in" from EPA
staff). Another study by Resources for the Future allocated transactions costs into several
categories; most frequently cited were: (i) those related to the 'lack of coordination among EPA
offices" and (ii) those related to the lack of clarity of the superior environmental performance
criterion. Allen Blackman & Jan Mazurek, The Cost of Developing Site-Specific Environmental
Regulations:Evidence from EPA's ProjectXL, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper #99-35,
at 16 (Apr. 1999).
200. Indeed, Weber thinks that collaboration will grow even in relatively inhospitable environments because of the gains from trade to be had. See WEBER, supranote 24, at 256-64.
201. See Freeman, supranote 36, at 90.
202. See Geltman & Skroback, supranote 64, at 33-34; Mank, supra note 40, at 70-88. For a
slightly different view, see generally Hirsch, supra note 40 (arguing that the EPA's implied
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processes are sufficiently new that we do not yet know how courts will
resolve disagreements over their legality. However, to the extent that
the existing legal regime impedes positive-sum change, the argument
in favor of reducing those impediments is a persuasive one, since there
appear to be unrealized gains from trade to be had. As of this writing,
two members of the U.S. House of Representatives are developing
legislation that would grant the EPA additional authority to grant
waivers from existing regulatory requirements where necessary to
implement positive-sum regulatory bargains."3
While this kind of legislation does nothing to change national
environmentalists' incentives, we believe it has value nevertheless, for
three primary reasons. First, it reduces the leverage that opponents of
bargaining within the EPA can exert, by eliminating two of their tools
of opposition: (i) the procedural requirement of notice and comment
rulemaking each time the EPA authorizes a regulatory waiver;' and
(ii) the argument that such waivers are illegal." This should ease the
passage of stakeholder bargains through the maze of veto points, at
least at the margins. Second, it enhances the legitimacy of collaborative regulation by adding the imprimatur of Congressional approvalthat is, by adding a legislative endorsement to the bargaining process
itself.' Third, it reaffirms the authority of the EPA to oversee and
approve these bargains.'
The importance of this last attribute of the legislative fix cannot be overstated. Given the political history of environmental regulation and of the EPA's role in that contentious history, any attempt to
circumvent EPA approval-even if that approval is sometimes unreasonably withheld-is doomed to failure. National environmentalists
inside and outside the Agency have proven time and again that they
will be heard in the environmental policy process. Any attempt to

authority to waive legal requirements is sufficient). But see the discussion of waiver authority,
supranote 40.
203. See Second Generation of Environmental Improvements Act of 1999 ("SGEIA") (draft)
(on file with authors). The prospective bill is being developed by Representatives Calvin Dooley
(D-Cal.)and James Greenwood (R-Penn.).
204. See id. at Title II (outlining the process and authorizing regulatory waivers).
205. For a discussion of this issue, see supra Sections ll.B-C.
206. See id., especially §§ 201-203 (outlining a process not unlike the current XL process, and
specifying that bargains include "better environmental results'). In our view, the concept of
"better environmental results" is defined unnecessarily narrowly in the current draft. The term
appears to require actual reductions of each pollutant covered by any regulatory bargain, thereby
excluding multi-pollutant or multimedia caps that might be viewed universally as environmental
improvements.
207. See id. at § 203 (b)-(d).
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ignore or avoid their input would strengthen the hand of opponents of
collaborative regulation within the Agency." 8 Conversely, by affirming
the EPA's authority to approve (and disapprove) regulatory bargains,
legislation may foster an environment within the Agency that is more
conducive to reform."°' Perhaps proponents of collaboration have not
fully appreciated the political context within which reform must occur,
and why their every action has seemed to provoke an equal and opposite reaction. The question is whether the disappointing results of
collaboration to date represent learning or failure. We hope they represent the latter. American environmental politics being what they
are, the cause of collaborative regulation can be advanced only
through a collaborative, and therefore incremental, process. In our
view, it is a cause worth advancing.

208. Indeed, the fanfare and bold proclamations of fundamental change that accompanied
the launch of Project XL may have contributed to its early problems by provoking just such a
response within the EPA. By better defining the limits of the process, legislation may help the
EPA embrace innovation.
209. For the same reasons, the SGEIA's inclusion of citizen suit provisions is wise politically.
See SGEIA, supranote 203, § 205(b) (1).

